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SPIRALING operating deficits 1 and current governmental investigations 2
have focused attention on the plight of commercial aviation, provoking
heated attacks from all quarters on the regulatory policies of the Civil Aero-
nautics Board. 3 Spokesmen for the air industry claim that indiscriminate
granting of route certificates has resulted in undue and destructive competi-
tion; 4 new concerns, seeking entrance into the industry, complain of Board
exclusionary policy. Galvanized into action by CAB proposals calculated
to capture large volumes of rail revenue, the railroads demand an end to all
government aid to the airlines; I combine with other surface carriers to attack
the Board policy which bars them from control of air carriers; 0 and even go
so far as to propose the abolition of the CAB.7
1. The aggregate net operating loss of the airline industry for the first six months of
1947 is placed at 17.4 million dollars as compared with a total deficit for the calendar year
1946 of 5.8 million dollars. H. R. REP. No. 1612, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1943).
2. E.g., Congressional Aviation Policy Board (Brewster Committee; national de-
fense and air power; Report: Sr. REP. No. 949, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. (1948)) ; President's
Air Policy Commission (Finletter Commission; national defense, military aviation, air-
craft manufacturing, civil air transport; report: SUTRvIvAL n TuE Am AGE (1948)) ; Com-
mittee on Post Office and Civil Service (Rees Committee), authorized by H. REs. No. 176,
80th Cong., 1st Sess. (1947) (air mail carriage, payments and subsidies). See also Aitchi-
son, After the War Is Over-Transportatio, Problems, 11 I.C.C. PaAcr. J. 743 (1944).
3. Hereinafter referred to as the CAB or the Board.
4. Fxecutives of the major airlines vehemently contend that the CAB has favored
a policy of "competition for competition's sake" and has indulged in the practice of "cut-
ting down" the larger airlines. 47 AvAion W'V= No. 13, p. 28 (Sept. 29, 1947). The
CAB is frequently accused of having embarked on a program of making big lines out of
small lines and of granting route extensions that result in parallel service, both of which
lead to "competition." Smith, C. R., Air Traysportation, Its Status, Trend and Prospect,
14 3. Am L. 150 (1947) (Chairman of the Board, American Airlines and President of
American Overseas Airlines).
5. Government assistance takes the form of airmail payments in excess of the value of
the services rendered by the airlines; the erection and maintenance of the navigational and
safety aids comprising the "airways'; and the provision of airport facilities at fees lower
than the cost of the service. Total public aid to domestic carriers through 1946 is estimated
at $207,268,113. H. R. REP. No. 1612, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. 14 (1948). See p. 1032 infra.
6. See p. 1065 infra.
7. This pressure of the railroads is perhaps the main reason for the current studies of
the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, known as the "National
Transportation Inquiry". Authority to investigate was granted in H. Rss. No. 318, 79th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1945), and continued in H. Rrs. No. 153, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. (1947).
The modes of transportation presently regulated by the ICC favor a single agency to con-
trol all transportation; the airlines wish to preserve their separate agency, the CAB. In
the event that all transport regulations were to be centered in the ICC, the motor and
water carriers request that the commission be reorganized. The railroads alone insist that
the present organization of the ICC be retained, and, further, that all the means of trans-
port within the area be integrated. Users of transportation are about split on the matter of
"integration": 49% not in favor; 51% favorably disposed but with the important qualifica-
tion that a monopoly should not result. House Sub-Commlttee Report on National Trars-
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Confronted with these partisan attacks as well as with the task of condi-
tioning and directing the future growth of a dynamic industry,8 the Board,
forced to defend its position, has sought to explain away the present unhappy
state of the industry 9 as a period of temporary losses incurred through large
preparatory expenditures aimed at increasing future cargo and passenger
revenues. 10 However, in simultaneously ordering investigations into possibly
portation Inquiry, 14 I.C.C. PRAcr. J. 296 (1947). For a note of opposition, see WprpuD,
JusTICE IN TRANSPORTATION 140 et seq. (1945). See Cunningham, The Transportation
Problem, 25 HAxv. Bus. REV. 58 (1946) (suggesting aviation is out of infancy and should
not be singled out for special promotional treatment) ; Brownell, The Air Coordinating
Committee, 14 J. Am L. 405, 410 et seq. (1947) (discussing possible departmental reor-
ganizations, such as, Dep't of Air, Dep't of Civil Aviation, Dep't of Transportation or a
Dep't of National Defense). The suggestion has been advanced that "competitive forces
* . . be permitted to determine the proper territorial and functional sphere for each mode
of transportation, on condition that provision be made to assure the continued existence of
each although perhaps in a seriously modified form." This would be in the nature of a
compromise between an administrative agency basing rates on costs and permitting com-
petition only on a service level; and the coordination of all transport which presents the
powerful carriers with a chance to dominate. Schrag, Competing Modes of Transportationl
and the L C. C., 94 U. oF PA. L. REV. 378,399 (1946).
8. Air transportation today is in the same relative state of development as the rail-
roads were 100 years ago. The CAB was established as the regulatory agency only 12
years after the first regularly scheduled flight, whereas the ICC was made an effective
supervisory body in 1920 by the National Transportation Act, approximately 90 years after
the birth of the railroads.
Comparative statistics highlight the rapid growth of air transport. Typical are the
figures of revenue passenger miles reported by the sixteen certificated domestic airlines:
1935 (fiscal year) 221,915,595
1946 (fiscal year) 4,526,391,220
1947 (Jan. through Sept.) 4,580,508,000
C.A.B. ANN. RE'. 47 (1941) ; ibid. 38 (1946) ; C.C.A. JouR. 140 (Dec. 15, 1947).
See generally Barnes, The Economic Role of Air Transportation, 11 LAW & Conni-r.
PRo. 431, 443 (1946). See also Burden, Postwar Status of the Aircraft Industry, 23
HARv. Bus. REV. 211 (1945) (postwar growth and effect on employment) ; I.C.C. BUREAU
OF TRANSPORT ECONOMICS AND STATISTICS, SOME ASPECTS OF POST WAR AI AND SUR-
FACE: TRANsPoRTATioN (1945) (analysis of growth prospects) ; WRIGHT, AVIATION'S PLACE
IN CvmxzATioN 22 (1945) (United States employment forecast for aviation and related in-
dustries 8 to 12 years after the end of the war-610,000). Industry executives forecast a
thirty-fold growth within twenty years of the war's end. This would entail the carriage of
80% of all pullman fares, 40% of rail express, 33% of rail coach traffic, 80% of the parcel
post shipments, 20% of the rail "less than carload" freight, and 5% of the motor bus
traffic. PATTERSON, SomE VIEws ON PosT-WAR AVIATION (1944) (President of United
Air Lines).
9. National Airlines, Inc., Mail Rates, 7 C.A.B. 387, 405 (1946). See SURVIVAL I
THE Am AGE 99 (1948) (Report of the President's Air Policy Commission which list some
causes of the difficulties) ; hereinafter referred to as the REPORT. All the various forms of
transportation currently are exhibiting signs of weakness. La Roe, A Weak Transporta-
tion System, 14 I.C.C. PRAcr. J. 327 (1947).
10. In the period July 1, 1945 to July 1, 1947, the 16 certificated domestic airlines spent
$235,000,000 for capital assets (largely planes), which sum is more than eight times the
total investment of the airlines in property and equipment at the outset of 1945. 47 AviA-
TION WEE No. 18, p. 51 (Nov. 3, 1947). In addition to the vast expenses incurred in
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uneconomic route characteristics," the CAB has suggested that it is less
than certain of its announced position. Current dislocation may not be trans-
itory; inquiry may reveal fundamental weaknesses incorporated into the air
transportation system by past regulatory policy.
REGULATORY CONTROL
Passed to salvage an industry that was described as in a state of "chaos," 1
the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938,13 setting up the Civil Aeronautics Author-
ity, the forerunner of the CAB,14 Nwas the first comprehensive legislation in
the field of air transportation. 5 Under the CAA air safety Nas regulated on
procuring capital assets, the airlines must expend sums training personnel for expanded air
operations.
11. Investigation of Chicago and Southern Air Lines, Inc., C.A.B. Doc. 2862, Order
E-401 (March 24, 1947) (mimeo) ; Investigation of Northeast Airlines, Inc., C.A.B. Doc.
2853, Order E-375 (March 18, 1947) (mimeo) ; Investigation of Western Air Lines, Inc.,
C-.AB. Doc. 2911, Order E-485 (April 29, 1947) (mimeo) ; Investigation of Colonial Air-
lines, Inc., C.A.B. Doe. 2852, Order E-373 (March 18, 1947) (mhmeo); Investigation of
Pennsylvania-Central Airlines Corp., C.A.B. Doc. 2883, Order E-437 (April 7, 1947)
(mimeo). These inquiries are conducted under authority of CAA §§205(a), 407(a),
415, 1002(b). Board Member Lee dissented in some of the cases, stating that such investi-
gations should not be authorized without the consent of the airline involved.
Simultaneously an inquiry was ordered into the operations of All-American Aviation
under the authority of § 401(h) with a view to the possible modification, suspension, or re-
vocation of the certificate. This was deemed necessary since All-American had lost $119,-
877 in 1946 despite an increase in its mail rate on Sept. 1, 1946, from 49.76 cents per air-
plane mile to 57.91 cents. Investigation of All-American Aviation, Inc., C.A.B. Dec. 2918,
Order E-494 (May 2, 1947) (mimeo).
12. CA.A. Axr. REP. 1 (1939) ; see p. 1059 infra.
13. 52 STAT. 977 (193S), 49 U.S.C. §§ 401-682 (1940) (hereinafter referred to as the
Act or the CAA). See Rwvxz, CrviL AERoxAuTics Ac,, Annotated (1939).
14. The functions of the Civil Aeronautics Authority were consolidated with the func-
tions of the Air Safety Board, and the merged body was redesignated the Civil Aeronautics
Board and transferred to the Department of Commerce for '%housekeeping" purposes.
Reorg. Plan IV (1940), 54 STAT. 1235 (1940).
15. In general, air mail had been the main concern of previous legislation, although in
1934 restrictions were placed on interlocking control, mergers, and certain other phases of
corporate life. See 43 STAT. 805 (1925), 39 U.S.C. § 461 et seq. (1940) (Air Mail Act of
1925) ; 44 STAT. 568 (1926), 49 U.S.C. § 171 et scq. (1940) (Air Commerce Act of 1926) ;
45 STAT. 594 (1928) ; 46 STAT. 259 (1930) (McNary-Watres Act) ; 48 STAT. 933 (1934),
39 U.S.C. §461 et seq. (1940) (Air Mail Act of 1934). In connection with these enact-
ments and the history of commercial aviation, consult Rinm op. cit. mspra note 13;
Fammucj, Co~m~mcAx. Am TRANsPoRTATioN (1947); Pu Frn, Am Tt.srorrmTio
(1941) ; SpiarcE, Am MMI. PAYuME= Am T E GovEwmrm (1941). Fa a--uc,, .spra,
and PuFFER, supra, treat many phases of the air transport problem. Most articles on com-
mercial aviation devote at least a few pages to a treatment of the general history. See e.g,
Hamstra, Two Decades-Federal Acro-Regulation in Perspective, 12 J. Am L 105
(1941) ; Ballard, Federal Regulation of Aviation, 60 HARv. L Rv. 1235 (1947) ; 1 A=na-
PORTs 42 (1947) ; David, Federal Regulation of Airplane Common Carricrs, 6 J. L u &
Pum. UTIu EcoN. 359 (1930). Roberts, Outlook for Post-War Aviation Law, 33 Gw.
L.. . 452 (1945).
Before the CAA of 1938, aviation's activities were handled by many separate depart-
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the widest possible scale; 18 and economic control 17 was imposed upon, all
airlines engaged as common carriers in non-intrastate transport of mail, or
of persons and property. s In light of current constitutional interpretation
of national power in the commerce field," the statutory limitation of CAB
authority to interstate air commerce has lost much of its significance and
today it is within the power of the Board to develop a nationally integrated
airline system. 20
Drawing on experience gained from other legislation regulating private
ments: Post Office Dep't (mail contracts) ; Interstate Commerce Commission (rates);
Department of Commerce (airways and safety regulation); Department of Agriculture
(weather reports) ; the Departments of State, War, Navy and the Treasury were involved
in varying degrees. Altschul, Economic Regulation of Air Transport, 12 J. AIR L. 163
(1941).
For a comprehensive picture of the vast number of agencies and departments which
even today are connected with aviation issues, consult Brownell, supra note 7, table at 407
(1947).
16. The CAB possesses power to regulate safety of flight in "air commerce." 52 STAT.
1007 (1938), 49 U.S.C. §551(a) (1940), CAA §601(a) (1938). "Air commerce" is a
comprehensive classification embracing "interstate, overseas, or foreign air commerce or
the transportation of mail by aircraft or any operation or navigation of aircraft within
the limits of any civil airway or any operation or navigation of aircraft which directly af-
fects, or which may endanger safety in, interstate, overseas, or foreign air commerce." 52
STAT. 977 (1938), 49 U.S.C. § 401 (3) (1940), CAA § 1 (3) (1938). The safety provisions
of the Act are further amplified by the Civil Air Regulations issued by the CAB. 52 STAT.
1007-12 (1938), 49 U.S.C. §§551-60 (1940), CAA §§601-10 (1938); 14 Coo. FEM.
R..s. (Cum. Supp. 1943) § .01 et seq.
17. 52 STAT. 987 (1938), 49 U.S.C. §§ 481-95 (1940), CAA §§ 401-16 (1938).
18. Economic regulation, as compared with the supervision of safety, is limited in
scope due to a narrow definition given to "air transportation." 52 STAT. 987 (1938), 49
U.S.C. § 481 (a) (1940), CAA § 401 (a) (1938) ; 52 STAT. 977 (1938), 49 U.S.C. § 401 (10)
(1940), CAA § 1 (10) (1938) ; see note 15 supra. See also Rhyne, Federal, State and Local
Jurisdiction Over Civil Aviation, 11 LAw & CONTEMIP. PROD. 459, 465 (1946) ; Current
Status of Aviation Law-American Bar Association Commerce Report, 14 J. AIR L. 217,
220 (1947).
19. North American Co. v. S.E.C., 327 U.S. 686 (1946); United States v. Darby, 312
U.S. 100, 118 et seq. (1941) and cases cited, reversing 32 F. Supp. 734 (S.D. Ga. 1940);
U.S. v. Wrightwood Dairy Co., 315 U.S. 110 (1942), reversing 123 F.2d 100 (C.C.A. 7th
1941); Houston, East and West Texas Ry. Company v. United States, 234 U.S. 342
(1914).
20. For an example illustrating the Board's broad power over the intrastate phase of
an interstate trip, see CAB v. Canadian Colonial Airways, 41 F. Supp, 1006 (S.D.N.Y.
1940) (carrier operating between New York City and Niagara Falls, New York) ; C.A.B.
ANN. REP. 36 (1941). The argument of state versus federal jurisdiction still rages. See
Hamley, Appropriate Areas of State Economic Regulation, 11 LAW & Cox=MP. ReoD. 488
(1946) ; Rhyne, supra note 18, at 466 et seq.; Ryan, Economic Regulation of Air Com.
merce by States, 31 VA. L. Rxv. 479 (1945) (member of the CAB advising that all control
be centered in the Board) ; Binzer, Civil Aviation--The Relative Scope of Jurisdiction of
the State and Federal Government, 33 Ky. L. R. 276 (1945) ; Ryan, Federal and State
Jurisdiction Over Civil Aviation, 12 J. Am L. 25 (1941) ; Willebrandt, Federal Control of
Air Commerce, 11 J. Am L. 204 (1940) (federal government has so thoroughly regulated
that only role left to the states is to assist where possible).
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enterprise, 21 Congress provided that no air carrier coming within the purview
of the statute was to operate without a certificate of public convenience and
necessity 22 issued by the CAB to a carrier "fit, willing, and able" to effec-
tuate a proposed operation in the "public interest." 2 In a departure from
legislative custom, Congress commanded the CAB to point toward certain
specific goals in effectuating the "public interest": 24 the encouragement and
development of an air transportation system properly adapted to the present
and future needs of foreign and domestic commerce, the Postal Service, and
national defense; the regulation and coordination of such a system to assure
adequate and economical service; and the utilization of competition "to the
extent necessary" to attain these objectives. Pursuant to the "grandfather
clause," established carriers were to be granted the necessary certificates
upon a mere showing of continuous and satisfactory service.2 5
21. See James, Air Carrier Regulation, 34 ILr. B. J. 193 (1946) ; Stough, Organica-
tion and Procedures of the CGil Aeronautics Board, 11 I.C.C. PRcr. J. 372 (1944).
22. Some elements in Congress desired unlimited competition but the Post Office De-
partment, opposed to such a stand, eventually was successful. GOODMAN, GoV.M; z ,r
POLICY ToWAm Co .nszcAL AVIATION 1 (1944). The "certificate of public convenience
and necessity" has been described unfavorably as a "legal device to keep air transportation
from developing more rapidly than is convenient for vested interests." IVnr'UD, op. eit.
supra note 7, at X.
23. "The Board shall issue a certificate ... if it finds that the applicant is ifl, willing,
and able to perform such transportation... and that such transportation is required by
the public convenience and necessity... ." 52 STAT. 987, 49 U.S.C. § 481(d) (1) (1940),
CAA § 401 (d) (1) (1938) (emphasis added).
24. "National interest in the narrowly commercial aspects of aviation is overshadowed
by the importance of air transport as an instrument of national policy--economic, diplo-
matic, and military." LIssITzYN, INrmvATioNAL Ant TRANspoxr 94 (1945).
The Act's provision reads that, "In the exercise and performance of its powers and
duties under this chapter, the Board shall consider the following, among other things, as
being in the public interest...
(a) The encouragement and development of an air-transportation system properly
adapted to the present and future needs of the foreign and domestic commerce
of the United States, of the Postal Service, and of the national defense;
(b) The regulation of air transportation in such manner as to recognize and pre-
serve the inherent advantages of, assure the highest degree of safety in, and
- .- foster sound economic conditions in, such transportation, and to improve the
relations between, and coordinate transportation by, air carriers;
(c) The promotion of adequate, economical, and efficient service by air carriers at
reasonable charges, without unjust discriminations, undue preferences or ad-
vantages, or unfair or destructive competitive practices;
(d) Competition to the extent necessary to assure the sound development of an air-
transportation system properly adapted to the needs of the foreign and do-
mestic commerce of the United States, of the Postal Service, and of the na-
tional defense;
(e) The regulation of air commerce in such a manner as to best promote its de-
velopment and safety; and
(f) The encouragement and development of civil aeronautics"
52 STAT. 980 (1938), 49 U.S.C. §402 (1940), CAA §2 (1938).
25. Those airlines in operation during the period May 14, 1938, to August 22, 1933,
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To implement the affirmative promotional duty in addition to the regula-
tory function, Congress authorized the Board to provide financial assistance
in the form of air mail payments to any certificated carrier which, under
honest, efficient, and economical management was contributing to the ad-
vancement of the industry. This aid was to take the form of airmail pay-
ments bearing no relation to the value of the services rendered by the air
carrier but designed to underwrite any operating deficit with the "efficient"
carrier receiving an additional amount calculated to guarantee a return on
investment and to spur incentive.25
Completing the supervisory pattern, Congress granted the CAB extensive
authority to regulate the economic structure and operation of the industry."
And most important, Congress provided that Board sanction of the acts of
an air carrier should cloak the participant with immunity from the operation
of the antitrust laws and the scrutiny of the Department of Justice.28
ECONOMIC CHARACTERISTICS OF THE INDUSTRY
Provided with regulatory machinery by the Civil Aeronautics Act, tle
Board was confronted with the problem of operating it in the context of the
inherent economic characteristics of the air transport industry. The CAB
could make little use of analogy to other fields of public utility regulation,
for the airline industry, when unregulated, possesses few characteristics of
a natural monopoly.
Absent regulation, ease of entry into air transportation is a prime factor
conducing toward free competition within the industry. By the standards
of large scale transportation, relatively little capital is required of the com-
mercial airline since the federal government erects and maintains the exten-
were eligible for such certificates. 52 STAT. 987 (1938), 49 U.S.C. § 481 (e) (1) (1940),
CAA § 401 (e) (1) (1938). Many Board members have stated that these "grandfather"
routes constituted an ill-advised air pattern which has constantly plagued the CAB in its
administrative action. See former Chairman Landis' dissent at p. 40 in Western-United
Acquisition of Denver-Los Angeles Route, C.A.B. Doc. No. 2839, Order E-772 (Aug. 25,
1947) (mimeo).
26. "In determining the rate [for the carriage of air mail] in each case the Board shall
take into consideration... the need of each such carrier for compensation for the trans-
portation of mail sufficient to insure the performance of such service, and, together with all
other revenues of the air carrier, to enable such air carrier under honest, economical, and
efficient management, to maintain and continue the development of air transportation...."
52 STAT. 998 (1938), 49 U.S.C. §486(b) (1940), CAA §406(b)(1938). See p. 1083
infra.
27. The CAB is given sweeping control over: accounting practices and reports; ap-
proval or disapproval of mergers, consolidations, sales, interlocking directorships, and loans
by government agencies to the airlines; and methods of competition, Perhaps one of the
most important powers is the right of the Board to establish appropriate classifications of
air carriers for regulatory treatment. 52 STAT. 1000 et seq. (1938), 49 U.S.C. § 487 ct .seq.
(1940), CAA § 407 et seq. (1938).
28. 52 STAT. 1004 (1938), 49 U.S.C. §494 (1940), CAA §414 (1938). This has
been a point of much contention. For an advocate of free competition with the Department
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sive "airways," the highways of the air; 2 federal and local funds provide the
'airports whose capacity is perhaps the most important physical limitation
on the scope of air operations. This freedom from a large fixed investment
assures low fixed charges and relates success more to efficient managerial
control of high variable expenses than to possession of great resources. In
addition, less capital is required since the great speed and flexibility of aircraft
renders each unit of capital highly productive.- And considering ventures
of approximately equal risk, it is relatively less difficult to obtain funds for
investment in air transportation because of the great public interest in its
prospective development.31 Finally, technological progress plays a more
important role in air transportation than in any other transport medium,
exercising a profound effect on the basic determinants of air traffic and pro-
viding an atmosphere wherein competitive forces may operate in the e.xploi-
tation of new techniques and equipment.
A finite air traffic potential, and the very facility with which new concerns
could enter the industry served to produce the relentless competition and
"chaos" that characterized the industry before the CAB. This economic
instability among smaller firms and the serious repercussion of cutthroat
competition upon the safety factor in public air transportation urgently
demanded attention. At the other pole, technological change, the operational
advantages of large aircraft, and the importance of a high utilization of avail-
able plane space were operating to mould an ever tightening core of oligo-
poly,32 advocated by the major lines as the panacea for the ills of destructive
rivalry. The "cure" developing was but another illness, for in it lay the germs
of monopolistic inefficiency, reduced emphasis on technology and cost, and
inflexible rate schedules. To cope with this anomalous coexistence of cut-
of Justice as the guardian against monopoly, see Wipnp, op. cit supra note 7 (foreword
by Thurman Arnold). The defense of the regulatory agencies, the ICC and CAB, is
presented in DRAYTox, TRAxSPORTATION UNDEn Two MAs ms (1945) (foreword by Ber-
nard Baruch); Smith, Application of Anti-Trus Laws to Rcgzldatcd Industriks, 14 I.C.C.
PRA. J. 181 (1947).
29. 52 STAT. 985 (1938), 49 U.S.C. § 452 (1940), CAA § 302 (193S). See note 5
suPra.
30. In 1941, the amount of capital investment required to produce $1 of operating
revenues was: airlines, $1.13; bus lines, $1.30; Class I line-haul railroads, $4.90. The rail-
road industry has a higher figure because of the sums invested in rights-of-wvay and termi-
nals. See Crane, The Economnics of Air Transportation, 22 HAnv. Bus. Rnv. 495, 496
(1944). It is estimated that "40,000 planes at 20 ton capacity could produce the same num-
ber of ton-miles in one year as the entire railroad system of the United States with its 13
millions of freight cars and some 40,000 locomotives... ." WnLmmiAs, Tim OuT-orn Foa
Doi Tssc Am TRANSPORT (Planning Pamphlet No. 211943).
31. Probably based on an appreciation of the government's airmail "subsidy" payment
policy. Seep. 1083 infra.
32. The members of this oligopoly, American Airlines, United Air Lines, Transconti-
nental and Western Air, and Eastern Air Lines, were products of the flurry of merger,
consolidations and sales that followed Charles Lindbergh's transatlantic flight.
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throat competition and oligopoly, some type of regulation was imperative 33
if air transportation was to attain full stature and become an integrated ele-
ment of the national transportation scheme.
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Balanced Competition
As the touchstone for the regulation of America's air system, the CAB has
evolved a basic philosophy of "balanced competition." 14 Although subor-
dinate phases are not clearly enunciated, the theory of "balanced competi-
tion" appears to be predicated on a stratification of the airlines into cate-
gories having common economic characteristics." The objective is to main-
tain "balanced competition", as opposed to undue rivalry, within each of
these classifications, and in fact gradually to strengthen the smaller air car-
riers by the addition of new routes and the extension of existing service 0
Such an affirmative policy, unique in regulated industries, would tend to
place the smaller airlines on a sound basis to offer competition to the parallel-
ing sections of the larger systems.37 And implicit in the theory of balanced
33. See Healy, Workible Competition in Air Transportation, 35 AMan. Eco. REv.
Supp. 229 (1945).
34. This policy was first enunciated in United Air Lines Transport Corp. Acquisition
of Western Air Express Corp., 1 C.A.A. 739 (1940). In this connection see generally
Highsaw and Burt, Competition Under the C.A.A., 6 LA. L. REv. 148, 157 et seq. (1945) ;
Melone, Controlled Competition: Three Years of the Civil Aeronautics Act, 12 J. AIR L.
318 (1941).
35. Crane has classified the airlines in order of decreasing size as follows:
Class I: American, United, TWA, Eastern
Class II: Northwest, Pennsylvania-Central, Braniff, Chicago and Southern
Class III: Western, Delta, Mid-Continent
Class IV: National, Continental, Inland, Northeast
Omitted: Canadian Colonial, All American Aviation, and Catalina.
This categorization is based on a mass of criteria; passenger-miles performed, seat-miles
performed, revenue-miles flown, capacity ton-miles or service offered, miles of route, total
assets, book value of real property and equipment, and operating expense. Crane, ,supra
note 30, at 501 et seq. See also, Barnes, supra note 8, at 433. Northwest more properly
should be classified as the fourth transcontinental carrier and listed in Class I, see note 37
infra.
36. E.g. Mid-Continent Air, Kansas City-New Orleans, 6 C.A.B. 253, 262 (1945)
(strengthening of Midcontinent) ; Colonial Air, Washington-Ottawa-Montreal, 6 C.A.B.
481, 501 (1945) (strengthening of Colonial) ; Colonial Air., Atlantic Seaboard Operation,
4 C.A.B. 552, 560 (1944) (strengthening of National to compete between New York City
and Miami, Florida, with Eastern Airlines).
37. In certain rare instances a smaller carrier will be tacitly reclassified on a multiple
showing of efficiency and growth of region served. The most notable instance of this is
Northwest Airlines which has become the fourth transcontinental carrier with routes from
New York City and Washington, D. C. to Seattle, Washington, and on to Tokyo, Japan,
Shanghai, China, and Manila, P. I., Northwest Airlines, Chicago-Milwaukee-New York
Service, 6 C.A.B. 217 (1944) (entry into New York) ; Northwest Airlines, Pacific Case, 7
C.A.B. 209 (1946); 7 C.A.B. 599 (1946) (supplemental) (entry into Alaska, Japan,
China, and the Philippines); Northwest Airlines, Detroit-Washington Service, C.A.B.
Doc. No. 679, Order E-861 (Sept. 30, 1947) (mimeo) (entry into Washington, D. C.)
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competition is a rejection of the concept of a "super-carrier" or "chosen
instrument" to exploit a specific market.33
While this theory seems generally desirable as an approach to the regula-
tion of the airlines, 9 the effectiveness with which the CAB has applied it is
open to serious question.
Entry into the Industry
Ease of entry into air transportation provided the CAB with a fertile
source of competitive stimulus which might have been controlled in the
public interest. Great numbers of applicants, attracted by the apparently
limitless prospects for air commerce, filed for certificates both to serve new
territories and to compete with existing airlines between cities already cer-
tificated.
Thus the Board early was called fipon t o formulate its policy on new en-
trants. Initial encouraging indications that new firms would be welcomed
proved short lived; 11 for in the leading case of Delta, Birmingham-Pittsburgh,41
38. "The question whether as a matter of policy United States international Air trans-
portation shall be rendered by a single company or by a 'chosen instrument'... vas
settled by Congress in the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938 when... Congress provided that
this Board in its decisions in new route cases, both domestic and international, should con-
sider as being in the public interest. . . 'competition to the extent necessary... "'
Northeast Air., North Atlantic Routes, 6 C.A.B. 319, 323 (1945). Pan American's claim
to "chosen instrument" status is opposed by all domestic air carriers except United Air
Lines which bases its position on the alleged insufficiency of transocean traffic to varrant
competition.
39. It is the Board's position that "[r]eference to both the legislative history and to
the text of the Act demonstrates the Congressional intent to safeguard an industry of vital
importance to the commercial and defense interests of the nation against the evils of una-
restrained competition on one hand, and the consequences of monopolistic control on the
other." Acquisition of Western by United Air Lines, 1 C.A.A. 739, 749 (1940). See also
Healy, supra note 33, at 229.
40. In the American Export case, 2 C.A.B. 16 (1940), a certificate vas granted to an
aggressive new firm to operate transatlantic service in competition with the "benevolent"
monopoly of Pan American Airways. And the principle seemed to have been settled that
established air carriers were to be given no precedence in the development of new services
when the Board in the All-American case, 2 C.A.B. 133 (1940), approved the issue of a
certificate to a newly organized company to operate a novel pick-up device for airmail
carriage eliminating the necessity of a landing. In the latter decision, the CAB vas un-
equivocal in its statement that: "Any such theory as advocated by the interveners [T\WA
and Eastern Air Lines, existing carriers], which would result in reserving solely for exist-
ing air-lines the privilege of providing all additions to the present air-transportation system
of the United States, is untenable. Our adoption of such a policy would certainly not be
consistent with a sound development of air transportation, and would not be conducive to
the best interests of the foreign and domestic commerce of the United States, the Postal
Service, and the national defense." Id. at 146. See Hamstra, Watson, and Barber, Mo-
nopoly Versus Competition in Air Routes under the C.AA., 12 J. Am L. 280 (1941).
For an account of the severe competition that American Export Airlines encountered
from Pan American Airways, consult JosEpHsoN, JUAN Tmn, AND THE STuoRU n reo
WoRaL AiRWAYs 139 et seq. (1943). Interesting light is cast both on the magnitude of Pan
American's lobbying and incidental expenditures, id. at 140, and on the ctaracterization of
the globe straddling airline by one of its own directors as a "benevolent, democratic mo-
nopoly." Id. at 202.
41. 2 C.A.B. 447 (1941). This decision came but six months after the result in the
All-American case.
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the Board laid down a canon of exclusion. Four applicants, two of which
were operating air carriers, were competing for various routes in the southern
states. The application of one of the new firms was denied on the ground that
the concern while "willing", lacked adequate finances and was not "fit" and
"able" to provide the desired transportation. But in the disposition of the
other new concern, an organization with sufficient funds that could not be
dismissed under the "fit, willing, and able" formula,42 the Board first enun-
ciated what was to be its philosophy on new entrants: the present number of
carriers in air transportation was deemed sufficient to protect against monop-
oly, and any future expansion of air transportation would best be accom-
plished by the certification of presently operating air carriers. 4
This startling rule banning new concerns from air transportation has since
dominated Board policy with but one fleeting exception. Board investiga-
tion 4 had revealed a limited market potential immediately available in
local service or "feeder" operations,45 and the CAB determined to treat this
new problem as an "unusual circumstance." Accordingly, newly entering
concerns, native to the area to be served, were certificated; and the applica-
tions of the established airlines were dismissed.4"
Unrestricted entry even in this field proved transitory, however. When
local airlines reported sharply rising operating costs in excess of estimates,
42. No attempt was made to dispose of this applicant on the grounds of insufficlent
funds; the CAB unequivocally stated: "The record indicates that this company will be
adequately financed." Delta, Birmingham-Pittsburgh, 2 C.A.B. 447, 479 (1941).
43. Id. at 480. In view of this later case, the American Export and All-American deci-
sions, note 40 supra, must be relegated to the easily distinguishable category of "unusual
circumstances." Viable new concerns had to be certificated in these instances since exist-
ing airlines had exhibited great reluctance either to oppose Pan American Airways in the
one instance or to develop new devices and techniques similar to the pick-up mechanism in
the other case.
44. Investigation of Local, Feeder, and Pickup Air Service, 6 C.A.B. 1 (1944).
45. The examiner's exhaustive analysis of local traffic possibilities stressed the impor-
tance of operating economies if successful operations were to be achieved. Smaller air-
craft, single pilot operation, elimination of luxury services, and reduction of intermediate
station personnel were among the suggestions which eventually caused the Board to con-
sider this service as differing from that presently performed by the certificated airlines. Id.
at 4. Many operating plans for the prospective new carriers were reviewed and evaluated.
Some were based on the trading area while others concentrated on serving a specific city,
fanning out in spokelike fashion. Id. at 30 et seq. See also in this connection, FREDEnICc,
op. cit. supra note 15, at 203 et seq. Attention was called to the fact that the airplane is
essentially an instrument of long distance transport. Statistics showed that the average
passenger journey was 450 miles and the most common trip was 250 miles. Airlines en-
deavoring to operate over shorter distances would be in sharper competition with the
highly developed surface transportation system. Investigation of Local, Feeder, and Pickup
Service, 6 C.A.B. 1, 2, 47 (1944) ; Nicholson, Possibilities for Lower Airline Costs, 11
LAW & CouxrmP. PvoB. 452, 454 et seq. (1946). For an analysis of the prospective market
for feeders, see Frederick and Hudson, Sources of Feeder Line Business, 13 J. AIR L. 99-
115, 212-27, 302-20 (1942) ; F DERICK, op. cit. supra note 15 at 212 et seq.
46. Typical of the comprehensive plans for expansion of the major airlines into local
or "feeder" service was the costly analysis made by Transcontinental and Western. TWA
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the CAB, ignoring the fact that a similar trend existed concurrently among
the older airlines, altered its policy and in subsequent route proceedings as-
signed the new cities* and towms to the routes of established airlines as inter-
mediate stops.47
The CAB has experienced no difficulty in effectuating its exclusionary
philosophy. The "fit, willing, and able" formula has become the usual Board
device for denying a certificate to a new applicant, and while it is true that
attention must be paid to this standard in the interests of air safety, the
criterion serves only to preserve the status quo when regarded by the CAB
as a blind requirement of possession of adequate finances, experienced avia-
tion personnel, and detailed plans for subsequent operation in the event of
certification. 43 Quite often ample financing is available but contingent on the
award of a certificate which in turn is conditioned on the possession of the
factors themselves.4 The result is that the arbitrary use of the "fit" and
"able" tag can lead to dismissal of an application where no actual insuffi-
ciency of funds will exist.a
desired "to concentrate on development of its present territory and to render intermediate
cities on or adjacent to its present routes the highest possible service." A state by state
exposition of its proposal was presented with extreme emphasis on service to even the
smallest hamlet by "multi-engine, luxury airliners." THE Amnm .,Dn YoUa CoMnnIT
2, 6 (1943). The cities involved were tacitly invited to intervene in the route proceeding.
Id. at 64 et seq. Compare this offer of "multi-engine, luxury airliners" with Investigation
of Local, Feeder, and Pickup, 6 C.A.B. 1, 9 et seq. (1944) (examiners report). See note
45 supra.
47. Great Lakes Area Case, C.A.B. Doe. No. 535, Order E-783 (Sept. 3, 1947)
(mimeo). In the next regional case, the CAB altered its policy once again and placed the
new cities on the routes of previously certificated "feeders", thereby creating a "Super-
feeder" with access to greater population pools over which to apportion fixed changes.
Mississippi Valley Case, C.A.B. Doe. No. 548, Order E-1060 (Dec. IS, 1947) (mimeo). In
any event, the major airlines consider the creation of feeder airlines to be dangerous prece-
dent since they fear that the local air carriers may eventually become the cores of larger
systems.
48. "The Act does not define 'fit, willing, and able' but the Board has established these
tests: (1) a proper organizational basis for the conduct of air transportation; (2) a plan
for the conduct of the service made by competent personnel; (3) adequate financial re-
sources." Braniff Airways v. CAB, 147 F.2d 152, 153 (App. D.C. 1945).
Further intensifying the burden of complying with the "fit" formula, Board decisions
are often long delayed, generally seventeen months after the filing of an. application in the
average case, and in the eleven most important route cases in 1946 and early 1947 the delay
between the filing of the application and the handing down of the decision averaged 1004
days. Westwood, Procedure in New Route Cases before the Civil Aeronautics Board, 14 J.
Am L. 267, 271 (1947).
Sluggish as CAB action seems to be, it compares favorably with the achievements of
the I.C.C. in view of the comparative complexity of the proceedings. Id. at 272 n.4.
49. Thus, new concerns may be put to the double strain of maintaining sufficient funds
for an extended period, and of retaining an experienced staff of aviation personnel who
must be hired away from existing air carriers generally at increased salaries in view of the
uncertain tenure. Actual cost to applicant of obtaining a certificate varies widely depend-
ing on the amount of professional assistance: an absolute minimum is considered to be
$5000, and costs may range as high as $50,000. 1 Azamwons 42, 52 (1947).
50. The Board has recognized "that the question of financing is inextricably bound up
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Restraint of entry in the air industry must be approached with caution,
for some of the very factors that encourage new concerns to enter, also tend,
if new entrants are denied, to inhibit effective exploitation of the existing
market potential by airlines already in operation. Up to the present, air
operations have served a "luxury" market, but future efforts to expand
domestic traffic must be directed at a reduction of the rate differential be-
tween air and surface carriage. 51 The availability of new frontiers, "luxury"
markets in other geographical areas, and the absence of competitive compul-
sion have conspired to prevent exhaustive development of the traffic poten-
tial in areas presently served.
Without the competitive force provided by new entrants, the lack of a
large fixed investment further reduces the compulsion to exploit existing
routes.12 The railroads, with huge amounts invested in rights-of-way and
terminals, are under a constant pressure to increase traffic, and thereby re-
duce fixed cost per unit of service; this pressure leads toward rate cutting as
a technique for increasing traffic. Conversely, the small fixed investment
which characterizes the air industry results in low fixed costs, and high vari-
able expenses increase almost proportionately with expansion in operation. 3
Reduction of air rates yields little material improvement in profit position
and the existing airlines are content to forego real exploitation of the market
so long as they are protected from intense competition.
Most cost factors, such as labor, equipment, and airports are offered to
all lines on essentially the same terms.5 4 Unions have standardized rates of
pay, except where regional differences are important.65 Modern airplanes,
necessary to excellent service, are available to all airlines; 10 airports which
with the major question of whether the certificate sought . . . is to be granted," but has
been reluctant to relax its firm stand on the requirement save in most unusual circum-
stances. American Export Airlines Trans-Atlantic Service, 2 C.A.B. 16, 42 (1940). Find.
ing a competitor for Pan American in trans-Atlantic operations was such an "unusual
circumstance." Ibid.
51. See Nicholson, supra note 45.
52. See Edwards, Competitive Problems Arising from the Existence of Fixed Costs in
the Transport Industry, 12 I.C.C. PRAcr. J. 1012 (1945).
53. Approximately 50% of airline costs are direct flying costs varying with the num-
ber of miles flown and a substantial part of the remainder are in proportion to service ren-
dered. See Healy, supra note 33, at 241. In addition, airlines have experienced a "rise in
ground and indirect expenses almost as fast as tonnage volume." Nicholson, supra note
45, at 453. In addition, as schedule frequency increased, unit costs declined only until the
point of 7.8 round trips daily (with DC-3 type aircraft) and then they started to increase.
Crane, supra note 30, at 506.
54. See Healy, supra note 33, at 229.
55. Id. at 229 n.1. Pilots' in 15 of the 16 domestic airlines are members of the Airline
Pilots Ass'n of America; mechanics of 12 of the 16 airlines are represented by Airline
Mechanics Ass'n International. With respect to regional rate differentials, see Crane,
supra note 30, at 505.
56. One of the concrete achievements of the Air M'ail Act of 1934, 48 STAT. 933 (1934),
was the separation of air transport and aircraft manufacturing. However, Healy calls at-
tention to a recent practice of informal agreements among a number of airlines to allocate
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might have charged all the traffic would bear and thereby provoked retalia-
tory airline combinations, have been made freely accessible at fees below
cost in order to attract air transport and stimulate business.Y Insulated
against outside stimulus, competitive forces within the industry are diverted
to the level of furnishing "services".
New entrants could have supplied the competitive incentive which the
Board has so eulogized. CAB policy, however, has been to restrict entry and
rely on the airlines already operating to supply the necessary spur.-s Airmail
subsidies have been employed to counteract the unfavorable economic trend
of the industry and the result has been a reduced emphasis on control of the
sizeable variable costs, 59 the most direct approach to lower rates. Thus,
while publicly stating that "administrative fiat" is incapable of supplying
the incentive required for the development of air transport," the Board has
been forced by its policy of restricted entry to rely on administrative tech-
niques in an effort to achieve the goal of better service at lower rates.
Entry of a Surface Carrier
The status of the surface carrier presents a special aspect of the entry
problem. Apparently inspired by a belief that growth of air transport must
be at the expense of surface carriers, the Board has pursued a special policy
of sharply limiting entry into the industry of surface transporters.6 ' To ac-
new plane types. In such a fashion a lower per unit price is obtained as tooling costs are
spread over greater production, but an opportunity exists for discriminatory treatment
if the CAB is lax in its examination of proposed agreements. See Healy, supra note 33, at
232.
57. Ibid.
58. Criticism from diverse quarters has been heaped on the CAB. Thurman Ar-
nold in the introduction to WipRuD, JusTicE ix TRANSPORTATiOx; (1945) declaims: "[the]
certificate of public convenience and necessity [is] a legal device to keep air transporta-
tion from developing more rapidly than is convenient for vested interests" Id. at .
This volume is a plea for free, or relatively free entry. The rebuttal is contained in fluAy-
Tox, op. cit. supra note 28 (foreword by Bernard Baruch) where the thesis is advanced
that railroads and other means of transport are so carefully regulated by efficient super-
visory bodies that there seems to be no justification for the Department of Justice to in-
tervene. But cf. State of Georgia v. Pennsylvania RR, 324 U.S. 439 (1946).
59. See p. 1082 et seq. infra.
60. "Thus, economic regulation alone may not be relied on to take the place of the
stimulus which competition provides to the advancement of technique and service in air
transportation. Competition invites comparisons as to equipment, costs, personnel, meth-
ods of operation, solicitation of traffic, ... all of which tend to assure the development
of" the desired air system. American Export Air, Transatlantic Service, 2 C.A.B. 16, 32
(1940).
61. Many views, some of them vehement, have been advanced on this subject. See
e.g. Baggett, Are Surface Carriers Grounded by Law? 31 VA. L. ERE. 337 (1945);
James, Control of One Form of Transportation by Another, 12 I.C.C. PreACT. J. 214
(1944) (surface carrier viewpoint); Tomlinson, Surface Carrier Participation in Air
Transportation, 34 Gro. L. J. 64 (1946) ; Acquisition of Control of an Air Carricr By
Another Common Carrier Under the Civil Aeronautics Act, Note, 10 GEo. VAsrr. L Ra.
719 (1942).
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complish this result, the CAB has utilized an extremely narrow construction
of a provision in the Act which prohibits a surface carrier from "merging
with or acquiring" an existing air carrier unless such surface carrier "could
,employ aircraft to public advantage in its operation." 11
Relying on a supposed intent of Congress to maintain independence be-
tween the various modes of transportation,63 the CAB has interpreted this
provision to mean that a surface carrier could only acquire an air carrier
whose operations were "incidental to the surface operations" 14 of the surface
transporter. Although the prohibition of the statutewas addressed to the
problem of mergers and sales, the CAB has extended this additional "inci-
dental" criterion to restrict surface carriers seeking to enter air transporta-
tion either directly by applying for a certificate,"5 or indirectly by organizing
a subsidiary.6 The Board has voiced the opinion that this is a valid interpre-
tation of legislative intent, but'subsequently when actually faced with a
surface carrier's application it has usually denied the application on the less
vulnerable ground that some other applicant is better fitted to service the
62. 52 STAT. 1001 (1938), 49 U.S.C. §488(b) (1940), CAA §408(b)(1938). The
Board, itself, has characterized its interpretation as "rigid." American Export Lines,
Control-American Export Airlines, 4 C.A.B. 104, 106 (1943) (supplemental).
63. This interpretation is based on a review of a series of Congressional enactments.
The CAB contends that as early as 1912 Congress announced a policy of independence of
water carriers from railroads. Panama Canal Act, 37 STAT 566 (1912). In 1935 there
was incorporated into the Motor Carrier Act a similar restrictive provision, § 213, 49
STAT. 556 (1935) which was the basis for § 408(b) of the Civil Aeronautics Act. Further,
Congress affirmed this policy by incorporating into the Transportation Act of 1940 the
provisions of the Panama Canal Act and of § 213 of the Motor Carrier Act. 54 STAT.
909, 49 U.S.C. 5 (14-16) (1940); 54 STAT. 906, 49 U.S.C. 5(2) (1940). For a consid-
eration of possible ambiguity in reenactment see American Export Lines, Control-Ameri-
can Export Airlines, 4 C.A.B. 104, 107 n.11 (1943) (supplemental).
64. American Export Lines, Control-American Export Airlines, 3 C.A.B. 619
(1942), 4 C.A.B. 104 (1943) ; Acquisition of TACA, S.A., by American Export Airlines,
3 C.A.B. 216 (1941) ; see note 66, infra.
65. American Export Lines, Control-American Export Airlines, 3 C.A.B. 619, 625
(1942).
66. Ibid. The Board's original view was that the statutory prohibition was solely
against acquisition of an operating airline by a surface carrier, and did not prevent a sur-
face carrier from organizing a subsidiary to become an air carrier. American Export Air-
lines, Inc.,--Certificate, 2 C.A.B. 16, 46 (1940). Pan American as an intervenor, how-
ever, carried the case to the federal courts where the Circuit Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit in dictiom stated that the CAB should consider the prohibition even in
granting new certificates. Pan American v. Civil Aeronautics Board, 121 F.2d 810,
815 (C.C.A. 2d 1941). Thereupon, the CAB required the American Export Steamship
Line to divest itself of control of the air carrier which had been granted a certificate as
a subsidiary of the steamship company. American Export Airlines, 3 C.A.B. 619 (1942)
4 C.A.B. 104 (1943) (supplemental).
However, the restrictive provision does not possess a retroactive effect and any
surface carrier control of an airline in effect on the date of the enactment of the Civil
Aeronautics Act falls without the purview of the restrictive proviso. Railroad Control
of Northeast Airlines, 4 C.A.B. 379 (1943).
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particular route, or that the particular air transportation is not warranted
by the public interest.7
The basis of this specialized treatment has recently been subjected to re-
examination under "unpleasant" pressure from the steamship companiesP
Altering its position slightly, the CAB conceded that Congress, while not
making mandatory the application of the "incidental to surface operation"
test in a situation where the surface transporter was requesting a certificate
directly or indirectly, had at least enunciated the criterion as an additional
guide to be considered in an evaluation of the "public interest" in the pro-
posed operation. 9 This is a distinction of dubious consequence, for it seems
clear that the Board will continue to consider this "incidental" test as de-
terminative.
The result is virtually a total ban on surface carrier enfry imposed by the
CAB. Legislative history does not necessarily dictate such a stand 71 and it
would seem to be a sounder course to disregard the superadded "incidental"
test and to consider each individual application on the merits. Protection
would be provided against any prospective monopoly by recourse to the
"competition to the extent necessary" provision involved in a consideration
of the public interest.71
However, even accepting the CAB's general thesis that applications of
surface carriers must be viewed with a jaundiced eye, its application in any
blanket fashion seems arbitrary. If it be argued that the CAB is restricting
entry of surface carriers to prevent unbalancing forces within the industry,
then the Board would seem justified in placing a ban on both steamship lines
and railroads, since an affiliation with either would tend to the creation of a
"super-carrier" with access to an extensive ground organization.72 But if
the danger assertedly to be guarded against is the entry into air transport
of a surface carrier which would have little incentive to promote air expan-
67. See e.g., Braniff Airways, Kansas City-New Orleans Service, 2 C.A.B. 727
(1941); Northeast Airlines, Northatlantic Routes, 6 CAB. 319 (1945); Rocky Moun-
tain Air Service, 6 C.A.B. 695 (1946) ; Latin American Air Service, 6 CAB. 657 (1946);
Hawaiian Case, 7 C.A.B. 83 (1946).
68. American President Lines, Ltd., 7 CAB. 799 (1947). Chairman Landis in his
concurring opinion comments on the extraordinary pressures brought to bear on adminis-
trative commissions and includes ex-amples of newspaper advertising specifically directed
against CAB policy. Id. at 818 appendix.
69. Id. at 801 et seq. The President's Air Policy Commission states that surface car-
riers "should not be automatically prevented from such action (control of aircarriers)
simply on the grounds that they are surface carriers-as now appears from the record
to be the case." REPFRT 116.
70. The legislative history is exhaustively reviewed in the concurring opinion of Chair-
man Landis in American President Lines, Ltd. 7 C.A.B. 799, 814 et scq. (1947). See
Hearings before Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce on Bills Relating to
Overseas Air Transportation, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. (1947).
71. See note 24 supra.
72. For an example of this, see Pan American-U.S. Lines Agreement CAB. Doc.
No. 2492, Order E-893 (Oct. 20, 1947) (mimeo) (agreement whereby a steamship operator,
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sion because of consequent harmful effects on its surface revenues, then the
case of the railroad should receive more severe scrutiny than that of the
steamship companies. 3 Proposed expansion of air revenues is to be largely
at the expense of the railroads which must protect a twenty-six billion dollar
investment,' 4 whereas an increase in transoceanic transport would not bear
too heavily on domestic steamship companies, 'since foreign shiplines carry
the great bulk of the first class passenger market.7
In any event, the CAB by pursuing its arbitrary policy has barred a whole
segment of trained capital from possible entry into air transport." To this
extent the Board has restricted competitive forces and furthered the oligo-
poly existing in the industry.17
Entry of Air Cargo Carriers
In no phase of commercial aviation has the beneficial effect of competition
been so vividly displayed as in the carriage of air cargo.78 This competition
has not been the fruit of an affirmative program of the Board, but rather is
the result of the exemption of non-scheduled operations from the requirement
of a certificate of public convenience and necessity."
Prior to the war, transportation of cargo by air was almost entirely in the
hands of the air express section of the Railway Express Agency which oper-
ated under a special exemption from the certificate required of a freight for-
U.S. Lines, acted as Pan American agent in Europe and British Isles, disapproved). Pan
American has engaged in similar contracts before. Pan American-Matson-Inter-Island
Contract, 3 C.A.B. 540 (1942).
73. Barnes, supra note 8, at 449.
74. Ibid. See PATTRsoN, op. cit. supra note 8. In 1941, air passenger traffic was
14% of the desired 80% of the pullman market. WILLIAMS, op. cit. supra note 30, at 4,
75. Only 15% of the United States flag steamship lines revenue in 1938 was from
passenger traffic. Cunard White Star might be adversely affected by an expansion in
transocean transportation by air since the major source of its 1938 revenue was passenger
traffic. Burden, supra note 8, at 215.
76. Needless to say, the certificated carriers agree with the CAB stand. For an inde-
pendent minority view see Burgess, Transportation for America's Needs, 13 I.C.C. PRAcr,
J. 604 (1946).
77. One has only to recall the American Export case to appreciate the possibilities of
surface carrier participation as an instrument in combatting monopoly or oligopoly. See
note 66 supra.
78. Air cargo is to be distinguished from air freight or express forvarding, discussed
at p. 1071 infra. Concerns engaged in air cargo activity actually transport pay loads from
airport to airport, whereas freight or express forwarders merely consolidate shipments and
then utilize the shipping facilities offered by cargo carriers.
Excellent histories of air cargo are contained in: Frederick, American Air Cargo
Development, 2 Am ArFAms 79 (1947) ; Frederick and Lewis, History of Air Express,
12 J. Am L. 203 (1941) ; McMillen, Air Express in the United States, 11 J. LAND AND
PuB. UTIL EcoN. 266 (1935) ; 11 id. 368 (1935) ; 12 id. 70 (1936).
79. 14 CODE FED. REGs. §292.1 (Cune. Supp. 1943). For an exhaustive treatment
of non-scheduled carriers, consult Neal, The Status of Scheduled Operation Under the
Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, 11 LAW & CONTEMP. PROR. 508 (1946). See note 85 infra.
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warder.80 The'Agency had separate contracts with each of the airlines
whereby the cargo while aloft was the responsibility of the air carrier and
the ground functions were performed by the REA.8' Disadvantages of this
arrangement were long apparent to the consuming public and the certificated
airlines: the promotional activities of air express were entrusted to a railway
organization; the efficiencies expected of a concern which possessed a monop-
oly of air express did not materialize; rates were not reduced in an effort to
expand the market, but rather a tendency existed to maintain the tariffs in
a fixed relation to those of rail express; and by the contracts the Agency re-
ceived a disproportionate share of the profits.82
A host of post-war aircraft operators utilized the exemption of non-
scheduled carriers from the certificate requirement to attack this monopoly
of air cargo transport. Surplus war equipment enabled these new entrepre-
neurs, veterans of the wartime airforces in the main, to enter into the car-
riage of air cargo. Competition and efficient methods of handling cargo
rapidly caused a reduction in rates to a point far below those of air express 83
and the speedy, reliable service become economically attractive to a con-
stantly expanding market."4 In 1946 alone the carriage of cargo by air in-
creased 1000%.
Initially, this competition was encouraged; in exchange for a greater mea-
sure of economic control, the Board revised the exemption governing non-
80. Railway Express Agency, Grandfather Certificate, 2 C.A.B. 531, 541 (1941). The
Railway Express Agency is more properly denominated a freight or express forwmarder
than a cargo carrier. See p. 1071 infra. However, it is necessary to consider the ac-
tivities of the REA in an evaluation of cargo carriage for prior to Oct. 15, 1944, the
Agency was the only concern that had filed schedules of rates for the transport of propearty
by aircraft. American Airlines was the first domestic certificated air carrier to challenge
this monopoly.
81. The contracts are described in detail in Railway Express Agency, Grandfather
Certificate, 2 C.A.B. 531, 532 (1941). For further treatment consult Railway Express
Agreements, 4 C.A.B. 157 (1943).
82. See WpR D, op. cit. supra note 7, at 14 et seq., 46; Frederick and Lewis, supra
note 78, at 228 et seq.; Drew and Passen, Air Cargo: A New Force it Mar:clting, 14
J. Amr. L. 11, 12 (1947). For a pro-REA position and a claim that the Agency has not
hampered the development of air express, see DRA-ro:, op. cit. tpra note 28, at 96.
The Board demanded that air express rates be independent of rail express charges.
Railway Express Agreements, 4 C.A.B. 157, 158 (1943). This demand, however, met
with little success for even with a 25% reduction over pre-war rates the air express
charges on Jan. 1, 1946 were 61 cents per ton-mile. Frederick, American Air Cargo
Development, 2 AiR AFrAms 79, 92 (1947).
83. Today, rates for air cargo are 10 cents per ton-mile for plane lot shipments, to
an average of 20-25 cents per ton-mile on smaller shipments. Air express charges are
still in excess of 60 cents per ton-mile. Drew and Passen, supra note 82, at 18. The
average long-haul rail carlot rate for fruits and vegetables is approximately 1.5 cents per
ton-mile. Id. at 20.
84. Newspapers, books, apparel, fabrics, flowers, etc., are among the items transported.
The saving of time in cargo transport must be measured in days to appeal to the market;
thus, short hauls are eliminated as a possible source of revenue. Id. at 14. Use of air
transport has resulted in many economies: reduction of packaging costs, inventory in-
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scheduled carriers so as to permit the larger noncertificated operators to
arrange scheduled flights the better to satisfy market demand.8 Simultane-
ously, an inquiry was launched by the CAB into all the aspects of cargo
transport as a step in the formulation of the eventual economic controls to
be imposed.
Abandoning individual counteraction, the certificated airlines responded
to the challenge of the independents 88 by establishing a joint cargo shipping
organization, Air Cargo, Inc., which has been sanctioned by the CAB and
thereby removed from the purview of the antitrust laws. 7 Climaxing the
ensuing rate war, some of the certificated lines filed schedules with the CAB
quoting tariffs four percent below those of the nonscheduled operators. The
CAB refused to suspend promulgation of these rates,8s noting that non-
certificated lines recently had been given the privilege of flying scheduled
operations and were, to that extent, competing on an equal basis with the
certificated airlines; and that the rate war had been precipitated by the non-
certificated operators who should have been cognizant of the fact that re-
taliatory action was possible. 9 Here was an echo of free and uncontrolled
competition.
Furthermore, the Board refused to entertain the claim that the certificated
lines had filed rates below the cost of operation; denied, that cargo deficits
were being underwritten by the mail subsidies which the certificated lines
alone received; and dismissed as "intended simply to confuse the issue"
vestment, warehousing and refrigeration expense; and less pilferage of and damage to
the goods shipped. BUREAU OF FOPEGN AND DOMESTIC CoumExcn INDUSTRY REPORT:
Do sric TRANSPORTATION 7 et seq. (June 1947).
85. C.A.B. Econ. Reg. No. 389, § 292.5; see C.A.A. Joua. 61 (June 15, 1947). Exemp-
tion will continue for a limited period and will apply only to those carriers with applica-
tions for certificates pending before the Board and who were also actively engaged in
cargo transport on May 5, 1947. The other phase of the new regulations for non-
certificated carriers dealt with irregular carriers that may carry both passengers and
property. C.A.B. Econ. Reg. No. 388, § 292.1; see C.A.A. Joun. 61 (June 15, 1947).
86. The only field of activity in air transport not dominated by either the certificated
airlines, or by the oligopoly composed of the four largest certificated carriers is air cargo.
In 1946, the nonscheduled (now uncertificated) airlines hauled the major share of freight,
but only 3% of the passenger market. Freight figures showed the noncertificated airlines
transporting 30 million tons to the certificated carriers' 14.83 million tons. A non-cer-
tificated carrier, Slick Airways, hauled almost as much as the combined total of the es-
tablished airlines. C.A.A. Joun. 75 (July 15, 1947). It is to be expected, however, that
the certificated lines, and the oligopoly, will achieve a greater share of the rapidly ex-
panding market. As of March, 1947, with freight tonnage 4199% over the correspond-
ing quarter of 1946, 15 of the 16 domestic airlines were carrying freight as compared to
7 of 16 in March, 1946. C.A.A. Joui. 64 (June 15, 1947).
87. C.A.B. Order No. E-1086 (Dec. 31, 1947).
88. Air Freight Forwarder Ass'n, C.A.B. Doc. No. 3132 et al., Orders E-852 and
E-853 (Oct. 2, 1947).
89. The Board dramatically characterized the position of the complaining non-cer-
tificated airlines as a "cry of 'unfairness' when the parties against whom the blow [rate
cutting] has been struck retaliate in kind." Id. at 11.
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the offer of one non-certificated operator to transport the mail at his cargo
rate, which was one third of the lowest mail rate paid the certificated air-
lines. 0
This abrupt treatment of the complaints of the non-certificated carriers
caused a general protest among the independent airlines over the interrela-
tionship of mail subsidies and cargo rates. Two of the three air carriers offer-
ing to transport cargo at 14 cents a ton-mile were receiving a mail rate of
45 cents a ton-mile; one was the fortunate recipient of 60 cents a ton-mile;
and another was boldly requesting an increase to a dollar a ton-mile for mail.
Finally, cognizant of the manifest incongruity of the situation,"' the Board,
on its own initiative, suspended the certificated airlines' low tariffs and or-
dered a comprehensive cargo rate investigation.02
If effective, the inquiry will isolate the factors determinative of rates, shed
light on the problem of "joint" costs that are allocable not only to mail car-
riage but other services also,93 and permit the Board to perform more effec-
tively its avowed function of relating rates to costs."4 But the consumer has
been a direct beneficiary of this vigorous competition offered by the non-
certificated airlines to the Railway Express Agency and the established
certificated air carriers. The emphasis on control of costs and the improve-
ment of techniques has led to startling rate reductions until today air cargo
tariffs are but a fraction of air express rates and closely approach the charges
of railexpress.9 5
Entry of the Freight Forwarder
Another phase of the air cargo problem is before the CAB for final action
after a five-year delay. It involves the freight or express forwarder, a rec-
ognized entity in all forms of surface transportation, a who, though not him-
90. Id. at 10.
91. The foregoing facts were known to the Board and were the subject of violent
argument during the proceedings. Id. at 9-10.
92. Investigation of Air Freight Rates, C.A.B. Order E-1016 consolidating all docl:ets
(Nov. 20, 1947) ; Petition of Slick Airways, C.A.B. Doe. No. 3170, Order E-916 (Oct.
24, 1947) (mimeo) (Board suspended the low rates and effected a "freeze" on rate filings
by both certificated and non-certificated air carriers) ; Investigation of cargo rates au-
thorized by Air Freight Forwarder Ass'n, CAB. Doe. Nos. 3042 3132, Orders E-754
and E-853 (Aug. 15, 1947, Oct. 2, 1947).
For a treatment of air cargo rates and rules prior to this action of the Board, see
Torgerson, History of Air Freight Tariffs, 15 J. Am L. 47 (1948).
The latest step in the controversy has been the promulgation of rates by the Board;
16 cents per ton-mile for the first 1000 ton-miles in any one shipment and 13 cents per
ton-mile for all ton-miles in excess of 1000 ton-miles in any one shipment. In the opin-
ion of the CAB the rates under investigation "endanger the sound economic development
of air freight." Air Freight Rate Investigation, CA.B. Doc. No. 1705 ct al, Order No.
E-1415 (April 21, 1948).
93. See note 160 infra.
94. Id.
95. See note 83 supra.
96. For a history of the express and freight forwarder in railroad and motor carrier
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self a carrier, consolidates small shipments into bulk lots, sharing with the
consignor the saving effected by the lower rate schedules applying to bulk
shipments. 7
In 1942, the Board deviously ascertained the supposed intent of Congress
and held that a forwarder shipping by air as a common carrier was an "air
carrier" within the meaning of the Civil Aeronautics Act," even though he
operated no aircraft, and must therefore obtain a certificate prior to opera-
tion.9 No certificates have ever been issued, and only the Railway Express
Agency has been fortunate enough to obtain even a temporary exemption
from the certificate requirement. 10
Manifestly this situation could no longer continue unnoticed in view of the
astounding increase in air cargo. The CAB has ordered the usual investiga-
tion into the proper economic controls for forwarders. 11 There is precedent
in other fields of transportation for permitting unrestricted entry,10 2 and this
appears to be a logical result even in air transportation, for the freight for-
warder is merely a large consignor and cannot precipitate the "destructive"
airline competition so feared by the Board.103 In view of recognized CAB
transportation, consult Elggren, What Part Shall Freight Forwarders Have in the
Development of the Air Freight Industry?, 14 J. AIR. L. 170 (1947) ; Ahearn, Freight
Forwarders and Common Carriage, 14 I.C.C. PRACr. J. 401 (1947).
97. Typical of a forwarding operation is the following: if each of 10 one-pound
packages were shipped separately from Detroit to Chicago, the REA's air express would
be $1 for each, or a total of $10; but, when a forwarder consolidates the ten shipments
into one 10-pound package, the total cost is only $1.32. Therefore, if a forwarder were
to charge 65 per one-pound package, he would receive $6.50 from the 10 individual
shippers and obtain a gross profit of $5.18. Universal Air Freight Corp,, Investigation
of Forwarding Activities, 3 C.A.B. 698, 703 (1942).
98. 52 ST.AT. 977 (1938), 49 U.S.C. § 401 (2) (1940), CAA § 1(2) (1938).
99. Railway Express Agency, Inc.-Certificate of Public Convenience and Necessity,
2 C.A.B. 531 (1941). The Board held that the Railway Express Agency was an "air
carrier" and thereby required to obtain a certificate prior to operation; but the REA was
not entitled to a "grandfather" certificate since that provision [52 STAT. 987 (1938),
49 U.S.C. § 481(e) (1940), CAA § 401(e) (1938)] only pertained to those concerns that
physically operated aircraft. By this decision the CAB secured control over forwarders
in the air industry without committing itself to a definite stand on the status of the REA;
and any attempt by the ICC to extend its jurisdiction over air forwarding because of the
railr6ad parentage of the REA was forestalled. See Elggren, supra note 96, at 196 et seq.
100. Ibid. Another concern contended it was a shipper, utilizing the services of REA,
and not an "air carrier." The Board answered this claim in the negative; refused an
exemption similar to that accorded the REA; and issued a cease and desist order. Uni-
versal Air Freight Corp.-Investigation of Forwarding Activities, 3 C.A.B. 698 (1942).
101. Re-indirect Air Services in the Transportation of Property, C.A.B. Doc. No.
2540 (Sept. 26, 1946).
102. In the modes of surface and water transportation embraced by the Interstate Com-
merce Act the instruction is specific: the ICC is directed not to "deny authority to en-
gage in . .. the proposed service . . . [freight forwarding] solely on the ground that
such service will be in competition with [that) performed by any other freight for-
varder. . . ." 56 STAT. 291 (1942) ; 49 U.S.C.A. § 1010(d) (Supp. 1946).
103. The air carriers, fearing competition for their newly instituted Air Cargo, Inc.,
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principles in other aspects of its regulatory policy, it seems probable that
the proposed control will bar forwarders dominated by a surface carrier, ex-
cept the Railway Express Agency, which possesses a unique claim if only
because of length of operation.10 ' Integration between air and surface for-
warders should be facilitated in the interests of efficiency since a sizeable
percentage of air shipments must travel part way to the destination by sur-
face carrier.10 5 Recent Board sanction of Air Cargo, Inc.,"^, to coordinate
the ground activities of the certificated airlines indicates that forthcoming
economic regulations will permit the airlines, certificated and non-certifi-
cated, to control air forwarders. 107
Public interest requires the entry of the air forwarder if a monopoly, or
at best a two-firm oligopoly, is not to obtain in air cargo transport. The
Railway Express Agency and the certificated airlines' Air Cargo, Inc., offer
extensive pickup and coordinated delivery service. A national network of
independent freight forwarders is required to supplement the competitive
effort exerted by the noncertificated cargo carriers, to perform the promo-
tional function in air transportation that was so ably effected by the freight
forwarder in surface transportation, and to pass on the economies of stream-
lined shipping techniques to the consumer.
1 3
Awarding of New Routes
The development of the "balanced competition" theory has been largely
evolved in the route award cases. The authority to award certificates for
new service and to extend existing routes provided the CAB with a powerful
tool useful both to alter the "grandfather" route pattern in the interests of
efficient service-and to affect the competitive structure of the industry so
as to approach the avowed goal of strengthening the smaller airlines and of
balancing competition.
Initially, the Board subscribed to the notion that air carriers would "emu-
late" the achievements of other airlines and a stimulus would be provided
even if competition were non-existent in a particular area. Although never
expressly abandoned, the theory has been eviscerated by the gradual formu-
have been opposing certification of the REA and freight forwarders. See Elggren, mspra
note 96, at 208.
104. It seems to have been definitely determined that the REA will not be granted an
exclusive right. Railway Express Agreements, 4 CA.B. 157 (1943).
105. Thirty percent of all air express is carried by rail during some part of the journey.
Nicholson, supra note 45, at 455.
106. See note 87 supra.
107. Any monopolistic tendency of such a course is weakened by the ease of entry into
freight forwarding, since it requires little capital and is essentially a "service" function.
108. The railroads, much in the manner of the airlines today, originally fought the
freight forwarder, but the situation has radically altered and the railroads now recognize
the promotional effort supplied by this group of consolidated shippers. Elggren, 'supra
note 96, at 209. The airlines might do well similarly to relieve themselves of promotional
expense at this stage of their growth.
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lation of the Board's present thesis that administrative fiat alone is not pro-
ductive of the incentive required to develop an efficient national air system;
that only by competition among existing carriers will the public interest be
advanced and the economies of technological progress passed on to the con-
sumer." 9 Maintaining that competition was not deemed mandatory by the
Act but was a matter of its administrative discretion dependent on the facts
of the particular case,110 the CAB originally permitted existing carriers to
compete between major air terminals, first over different intermediate routes,
and later, on a point to point basis. And ultimately a prima facie presump-
tion was developed calling for competition on qll routes that, in the Board's
opinion, exhibit two-carrier traffic potential, unless it be shown that the
service of the second airline cannot be integrated into an economically self-
sustaining system, or that there would be undue diversion of revenue from
existing carriers.' This competition is today said to be justifiable to assure
incentive and not dependent on the inability or unwillingness of the existing
carrier to furnish the additional service.112
As a result of this process of doctrinal evolution, Board action has been
uniformly successful in enlarging and modernizing the original "grandfather"
route system. Awards have multiplied air mileage, and certification in most
instances has been carefully premised on an exhaustive study of a mass of
criteria indicating possible national or local need for the particular service.'
Further, the CAB has been most active in adjusting the national air map to
technological progress in operating performance. Aware of the long range
flight potentialities of modern aircraft, the Board has granted permission to
109. It is estimated that the reduction of costs through technology may permit a 30S
cut in passenger rates and a 50% decrease in cargo rates; reduction of costs may also be
achieved by an increase in airline operating efficiency. Barnes, supra note 8, at 441.
The CAB first realized the importance of this argument in transocean travel insulated
from domestic activity. American Export Airlines, Trans-Atlantic Service, 2 C.A.B. 16,
29 (1940); Additional Latin American Air Service, 6 C.A.B. 857, 863 (1946); North-
east Airlines, North Atlantic Routes, 6 C.A.B. 319, 326 (1945).
110. American Export Airlines, Transatlantic Service, 2 C.A.B. 16, 31 (1940).
111. Transcontinental & W. A., North-South California, 4 C.A.B. 373, 375 (1943).
But in the West Coast Case, 6 C.A.B. 961, 970 (1946) the Board states that "the compe-
tition will be the incidental result and not the justification for the extension [of service]."
But see the treatment of "competition for competition's sake" in Northeast Airlines,
Boston Service, 4 C.A.B. 686 (1944) where the phrase is described as "meaningless,"
since there are many other factors to be considered in a route award. Id. at 690. In
any event, the Board possesses wide authority under the provision providing for "compe-
tition to the extent necessary" to prescribe the amount of competition as it will.
112. Transcontinental & W.A., North-South California, 4 C.A.B. 373, 375 (1943); see
note 111 supra.
113. Northwest Airlines, Duluth-Twin Cities Operation, 1 C.A.A. 573 (1940) ; Trans-
continental & W.A., North-South California, 4 C.A.B. 254 (1943). For evaluations of
the criteria considered determinative, see 1 AEREPoRTs 42 (1947); McMillan, Factors
Considered by Civil Aeronautics Board in Certifying Air Carriers, 14 GEo. WAsH. L. Ray.
611 (1946) ; Paradis, Reference Material Pertaining to the Economic Regulation of Com-
mercial Air Transportation, 7 FED. B. J. 98 (1945) ; Cromelin, Practice and Procedure it
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consolidate routes and to fly non-stop schedules over the merged segment,11 4
even where this has served to divert revenue from other carriers. Effective
action in the supervision of the route pattern, however, has been handicapped
by a lack of authority, often requested by the Board of Congress," 5 to revoke
route certificates when the public interest dictates.
In direct contrast to its effective record in adapting the route pattern to
service requirements is the failure of the Board to use route amards to achieve
balanced competition within the structure of the industry. Even as smaller
carriers were strengthened by route additions and extensions, the major air-
lines, members of the oligopoly inherited by the Board, were correspondingly
aggrandized; certificates were granted to the larger lines permitting them to
round out strong long range domestic routes and to engage in trans-Pacific
and trans-Atlantic service,' the latter characterized by the CAB as one of
the richest pools of traffic." 7
In the award of the prime overseas routes to the larger airlines operational
efficiency could not have been the determinative factor, since airlines of the
second magnitude exhibit the same operatirig results as the major airlines
when both employ the same type aircraft."' Furthermore, because of this
Board policy the major airlines have been increased to a size more than large
enough to utilize modem and efficient aircraft, whereas the small lines oper-
ate systems that in most instances are, without expansion, incapable or effi-
ciently employing long range aircraft."19
The impact of technology has augmented the ill effects of the Board's
regulatory policy in route awards. The ability to realize the economies of
the new aircraft rests mainly with the major air carriers possessing sufficient
New Route Cases Before the C.A.B. 12 J.B. Ass'" D. of C. 212 (1945). The Board
publishes the results of its many surveys of market data. See CAB, OUGI.n um Dusn-
NATION OF AmLINE TAFFrIc (1940); CAB, ANNUAL Ain.nE STrAsTcs Donzsrxc
CARRnms; CAB, ATnaRn TRarric SuRva (1946); CAB, Ecooomuc CHARacraxs-ncs OF
URnAN PorNTs Nor CERTIFICATED FOR AI SEvicE As OF APR= 1945 (1946).
114. American Airlines Nonstop Services, 7 CAB. 13, 16 (1946), American Airlines,
Consolidation of Routes, 7 C.A.B. 337 (1946).
115. C.A.B. ANN. RE. 18 (1942). At present a certificate may only be revoked for
an intentional failure to comply with Board directives. See note 136 infro.
116. Northeast Airlines, North Atlantic Routes, 6 C.A.B. 319, 344 (1945) (TW.A.
granted rights; American Airlines to acquire the presently operating American Export
Air). Transcontinental airlines, possessing strong financial resources and profitable do-
mestic routes apparently were preferred for this overseas business because of Board
concern over prospective severe competition from foreign government-controlled air
carriers.
117. Id. at 324. In less lucrative markets, such as the Caribbean, smaller domestic air-
lines were permitted to share along with the major airlines if the additional service could
be integrated into the existing system. Latin American Air Service, 6 CAB. 857 (1946)
(American Airlines, Braniff, Chicago and Southern, Colonial Airlines, National Airline,
Western Air Lines, Eastern Air Lines).
118. See Crane, supra note 30 at 507; Healy, supra note 33, at 241.
119. The best operational range for the Constellation type aircraft is 1000 miles and
above as compared to 400 miles for the DC-3.
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capital resources 20 and the long haul routes between important population
centers with a traffic potential that will assure adequate load capacities.
Increased flying range further strengthens the bargaining position of the
larger airlines in that they alone can supply "one plane" and "one carrier"
service between the important cities with a minimum of inconvenient connec-
tions. As a result, the smaller airlines are further adversely affected by tech-
nological progress, since they lose the revenues from the connecting service
which they formerly furnished. 121
The overall result of the Board's policy on route awards has been to pre-
serve the wide disparity in size and strength of the carriers and to retain un-
scathed the oligopoly condition. 12 2 Criticism may well be leveled at the
Board on this score, since it had the necessary authority to alter the corpo-
rate structure of the industry, and had itself taken the view that a partial
solution to the industry's ills lay in strengthening the small lines.
Mergers, Consolidations, and Acquisitions
Perhaps as a result of the oligopoly long prevailing in the industry, the
CAB was early forced to enunciate its policy on mergers, consolidations,
and acquisitions of control of one carrier by another. Board action, consist-
ent with the theory of balanced competition, has been directed at preventing
the emergence of a "super-carrier" and at strengthening the competitive
position of the small airlines. To this policy must be added the scattered
holdings of diverse cases where the decision seems to have been predicated
on no other policy than sheer expediency.
The Civil Aeronautics Act provisions on mergers, consolidations, and sales
are more complex than these relevant in the award of certificates, for not
only must the public interest be considered, but no transaction is to be ap-
proved which creates a monopoly and thereby restrains competition or jeop-
ardizes another carrier.123 As interpreted by the Board, this permits the
approval of arrangements that restrain competition or jeopardize another
carrier as long as they do not arise from a monopoly condition.12 4 It then
120. A problem that faces the usual small concern in most lines of endeavor is the
excessive, cost of raising capital. Figures reveal that firms of less than $1,000,000 capital-
ization must pay 20% of the stock sales price as a flotation fee, whereas a concern with
over $10,000,000 capitalization is required to pay a fee of only 9%. Ryan, Problcmns of
Our Domestic Air Transportation, 19 NOTRE DAm- LAW. 85, 95 (1943).
121. Typical of such a situation was the position of Western Air, and United Air Lines
at Denver. Over 80% of Western's Los Angeles Traffic originated on or continued along
United's route. Therefore, when United, in 1947, was granted entry into Los Angeles,
Western was faced with a serious revenue loss.
122. "Big Five" account for over 80% of revenue passenger miles, 90% of express
pound miles, and 90% of mail pound miles. Fnznmicx, op. cit. supra note 15, at 129. Con-
sult current issues of C.A.A. JOUR. for operating statistics of the certificated airlines,
See also Healy, supra note 33, at 241.
123. 52 STAT. 1001 (1938), 49 U.S.C. § 488(b) (1940), CAA § 408(b) (1938).
124. United Air Lines-Western Air Express, Interchange of Equipment, 1 C.A.A.
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becomes of determinative influence to decide what constitutes a "monopoly".
The CAB has chosen to define monopoly in the economic sense of control of
the market place and has rejected the antitrust definition of monopoly as
"restraint of competition". 125 Thus, by its findings as to the degree of con-
trol present, the Board possesses wide latitude to approve or disapprove
agreements endangering competitors. In essence, the Board asserts that
there may be restraint of competition without a simultaneous increase in
control of the market place, a contention violative of accepted thought on
the subject. 6
The CAB has displayed fertile imagination in creating rationales necessary
to achieve its first objective, the prevention of the emergence of a "super-
carrier". In denying sanction to a proposed merger which would have con-
stituted the applicant the second largest domestic system, -' the Board
emphasized the fact that certain routes of the contracting parties served the
same population centers. Board criticism was thus not leveled at the size of
the proposed organization but at the concentration of control of the particu-
lar market place. 23 In a subsequent proceeding the CAB was confronted
with a proposed acquisition of a strong regional carrier by American Airlines,
already the largest domestic air carrier. 12  Since the two airlines did not serve
the same territory but merely crossed at one point, additional control of the
same market was not involved. Classifying the two systems meeting in the
723, 733 (1940). In this case, the Board sanctioned a sleeper interchange agreement be-
tween Western and United which eliminated an inconvenient connection at Salt Lake City.
This transaction jeopardized another carrier, but the Board enunciated a principle to
which it has generally adhered: "[i]f... competitors are to be prevented from inaugu-
rating improvements in service solely as a protection to a particular air carrier, the de-
velopment of an adequate air transportation system in this country will be retarded rather
than assured." Id. at 731; see Northwest Airlines, Consolidation of Routes, 7 C.A.B.
199 (1946). Where Northwest was permitted to operate directly to Butte, Montana,
from Portland, Oregon, since a saving of 60 minutes in travel time outweighted the ill
effects of revenue diversion from United Air Lines at Portland. Id. at 203.
125. United A.L.-AVestern A.E., Interchange of Equipment, 1 C.A.A. 723, 733 (1940).
The Board -exhaustively examines the various definitions of monopoly. See also Mason,
fonopoly in Law and Economics, 47 YAn L. J. 34 (1937) ; Hamstra, Watson, Barber,
Monopoly versus Competition in Air Routes under the C.A.A. 12 J. Am L. 280 (1941).
The legal syntax conceives of monopoly as a restraint of competition and the antithesis
as free competition; whereas to the economist, monopoly is control of the market and
its antithesis is pure competition. In America, the courts have accepted the legal defini-
tion of monopoly and, although they keep referring to control of the market, there is
little factual consideration of such control. Mason, supra at 34-45.
126. See Mason, supra note 125.
127. Acquisition of Western Air Express by United Air Lines, 1 C.A.A. 739 (1940);
11 J. Am L. 359 (1940). The proposal would have merged United, one of three trans-
continental carriers and the second largest of the 17 domestic airlines, with Western, a
north-south regional carrier and one of the eight largest airlines.
128. Id. at 750. The extent of domination of air traffic in the western states if the
merger had been approved is graphically portrayed. Id. at 746 ct scq.
129. American Airlines, Inc., Acquisition of Control of Mid-Continent Airlines, 7
C.A.B. 365 (1946).
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one small area as impossible of "integration",' the Board thereby displayed
a further rationale capable of being employed to forestall the emergence of
any carrier dominant either in the control of a specific market, or in the mat-
ter of route size.
The second discernible policy relevant to mergers, consolidations and
sales has been in furtherance of the declared intention of the CAB to assist
the small airlines. Two techniques are available: the granting of new routes
to small airlines, 31 and the consolidation of a number of the minor carriers.
Failure of the Board route award policy to reduce the great disparity in
the size of the carriers has focused attention on the merger technique as a
means of equalizing opportunity.
The almost total absence of examples of voluntary mergers or consolida-
tions among small lines designed to provide competition for major air carriers
suggests the limited efficacy of voluntary merger as an affirmative instrument
of Board policy. 13 2 The signal lack of success which has characterized the
CAB's exercise of moral suasion to encourage private agreements on benefi-
cial consolidations and sales 113 has influenced some members to consider the
use of some form of coercion as a means of accomplishing desirable mergers
of smaller units into transcontinental or multi-regional airlines 134 which
130. Id. at 373. The CAB conducted an extensive survey of past passenger exchange
between the proposed participants in order to ascertain whether a community of interest
existed.
131. See note 36 supra.
132. Typical of desirable combinations is the Northern Consolidated Case, C.A.B.
Doc. No. 2209 (May 8, 1947). Permission was granted to six airlines to consolidate in
southeastern Alaska; the merged airline will compete with one if not all three of the
other airlines in the area, Pacific Northern, Alaska Airlines, and Pan American Airways.
133. Industry commentators are pessimistic about successful consummation of present
proposed airline mergers. See 47 AVIATioN WEEK No. 1, p. 57 (July 7, 1947).
134. For a statement of the position see former Chairman Pogue's "concurring and
dissenting" opinion in Northwest Airlines, Chicago-Milwaukee-New York, 6 C.A.B. 217,
243 (1944). Former Chairman Landis was of the same opinion. 47 AVIATIOx WEEK No.
18, p. 51 (Nov. 3, 1947). It is impossible to forecast what will be the consensus of the
new CAB. Another device, in addition to the merger or consolidation, is the interchange
agreement whereby airlines agree to permit the aircraft of other, carriers to operate over
their routes in order to eliminate inconvenient stops. See Westwood and Jennes, Corn-
pulsory Interchange of Aircraft Between Connecting Air Carriers, 34 VA. L. Rv. 1
(1948). It enables a smaller line to render "one plane" service between major terminals
and thereby to compete on a service level with the larger air systems. The technique
has never been very popular, the airlines preferring to apply for route extensions rather
than join in an interchange arrangement; only three such agreements have been sanc-
tioned. United A. L.-Western A. E., Interchange of Equipment, 1 C.A.A. 723 (1940)
(permission granted to exchange sleeper planes; terminated by exigencies of war;) Pan
American-Panagra Agreement, C.A.B. Doc. No. 2423 (May 5, 1947) (interchange of
equipment at the Canal zone) ; Transcontinental and Western Air-Delta Air Lines, In-
terchange of Equipment, C.A.B. Doc. No. 2346, Order E-1084 (Dec. 29, 1947) (mimeo)
(permission granted to interchange equipment on routes through Cincinnati).
Executives of some airlines have gone on record as favoring a realignment of routes by
mergers, purchase and sale, or even an exchange. Smith, supra note 4.
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would permit more air systems to have access to approximately equal pools
of population, the main determinant of traffic. 135 Such drastic steps may be
necessary in view of the deficiency of the legislative enactment to authorize
the Board to revoke certificates when the public interest so requires. Though
repeatedly requested by the CAB,' - Congress has never seen fit to grant this
power, evidently disturbed by a possible loss of confidence on the part of the
investing community which desires the certainty of duration characteristic
of the certificate."7
This same solicitude for financial interests has led to random Board deci-
sions, unclassifiable under any consistent policy, which indicate that the
Board has occasionally pursued an unfortunate path of expediency in the
matter of mergers and sales. This seemingly has been inspired by a dread
of the supposedly evil effects of bankruptcy upon the reputation of the air
industry and by a desire to eliminate inefficient management. 1 1 In Western-
United, Acquisition of Air Carrier Property,", the Board sanctioned a pri-
vately arranged sale by Western to United of the right to operate a specific
route and permitted a purchase price that was twice the value of the tangible
assets at depreciated cost. This excess amount was paid for the intangible
asset, the certificate of public convenience and necessity previously granted
by the CAB to Western at no charge."' By approving this transaction the
Board moved counter to an express provision in the Act which states that
no proprietary interests are conferred on the holder of a certificate.14 '
135. See Healy, supra note 33, at 237. The Board has stated that any desire to
equalize the "size or opportunities of the various air carriers" is subordinate to the con-
sideration of the "public interest" which dictates new routes. Northwest Airlines, Chi-
cago-Milwaukee-New York, 6 C.A.B. 217, 224 (1944).
136. C.A.B. ANN. REP. IS (1942). At present a certificate may only be revoked for an
intentional failure to comply with Board directives. The President's Air Policy Com-
mission suggest the use of "need" airmail payments to force the airlines to follow the
dictates of the Board. REPoRT 111.
For an interesting discussion of the problems raised by the airmail route cancella-
tions of 1934, see Campbell, Procedural Due Process in the Cancellation of Airmail Route
Certificates, 21 VAsm L. REv. 12-3-55,206-27 (1946).
137. Time limits have been applied in the approval of "feeder" applications (3 years)
and foreign operation (7 years). Local, Feeder, and Pick-up Air Service, 6 C.A.B. 1,
4 (1944) ; Northeast Airlines, North Atlantic Route Case, 6 C.A.B. 319 (1945). "Feeder"
airlines may obtain a permanent certificate if the particular operation is successful.
138. See Western A.L.-Acquisition of Inland Air Lines, 4 C.A.B. 654 (1944). This
sale was approved in order to eliminate Inland's inefficient management although there
was scant opportunity for integration since only 5.2251 of Inland's traffic traveled over
Western's routes. Compare this Board decision with American Airlines, Acquisition of
Control of Mid-Continent Airlines, 7 CAB. 365 (1946), where the CAB pursued a
consistent policy, withholding approval since the carriers exhibited slight integrational
characteristics.
139. CAB. Doc. No. 2839, Order E-772 (Aug. 25, 1947) (mimeo); Note, 48 Cor-
L. REV. 88 (1948).
140. See Wpi w, op. cit. supra note 7, at 43.
141. 52 STAT. 987 (1938), 49 U.S.C. §481(j) (1940), CAA §401(j)(193S). See
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Equal to the task of selecting plausible rationales, the Board justified its
decision on a number of grounds. The majority asserted that private initia-
tive should be encouraged to realign the route pattern, otherwise a "freeze"
would ensue; 142 and that the amount in excess of the value of the tangible
assets was "essentially an appraisal of the prospects for successful operation
in the future." 14 Deeming the purchase price to be not unreasonable, the
Board called attention to the excellent balance sheet position of the vendee
and concluded that United could afford the purchase price even though in
excess of the value of tangible assets.144
This reference to the financial position of the vendee directs attention to
the underlying reason for the decision, the straightened circumstances of
the vendor.14 Western's profit on the immediate transaction was illusory,
since this windfall merely would reduce the operating deficit and therefore
reduce future mail payments by the government. 146 However, approval of
this transaction was a condition precedent to a loan by the Reconstruction
Finance Corporation to Western, the proceeds of which were urgently re-
quired to meet maturing obligations that might well have precipitated re-
organization proceedings. 147 The CAB by this action has again moved to
preserve inefficiency in much the same manner as employed in the "special"
mail payments made to airlines in straitened financial circumstances. It
might be wise for the Board to review its position in the light of the Civil
Former Chairman Landis' dissent in the Western-United, Acquisition of Air Carrier
Property, C.A.B. Doc. No. 2839, Order E-772 at 17 (Aug. 25, 1947).
142. It is a matter of conjecture whether the approval of this sale will facilitate route
adjustments or whether it will strengthen the position of the prospective vendor. Further,
there is some question as to the desirability of private initiative as a determinant of the
route pattern once the industry has been subjected to governmental regulation.
143. Western-United, Acquisition of Air Carrier Property, C.A.B. Doc. No. 2839,
Order E-772 at p. 37 (Aug. 25, 1947) (mimeo).
144. Pointing up the obvious makeweight character of this argument is the fact that
in a previous proceeding the CAB had refused to certificate a competitor to United on
the Seattle-San Francisco route because of a solicitude for United's declining financial
position. West Coast Case, 6 C.A.B. 961 (1946). However, competition was subse-
quently permitted.
Also compare the Board's previous stand that "[t]he reasonableness of the acquisition
price may not be judged solely by whether the purchaser can afford to pay that price."
National-Caribbean-Atlantic Control Case, 6 C.A.B. 671, 677 (1946).
145. A prior Board decision approving the acquisition by Western of Inland Air Ex-
press probably was a contributing factor to Western's present financial difficulty. The
CAB had admitted that its main purpose in sanctioning the sale was to eliminate Inland's
inefficient management. Unsuccessfully the dissent had endeavored to remedy the weak-
nesses in Inland's structure before any approval of the sale. Western A.L. Acquisition
of Inland Air Lines, 4 C.A.B. 654, 664 (1944).
146. This is true because Western is in "need" of special financial assistance. See in
this connection former Chairman Landis' dissent at p. 43 in Western-United, Acquisition
of Air Carrier Property, C.A.B. Doc. No. 2839 Order E-772 (Aug. 25, 1947) (mimco).
147. The CAB must approve all loans made by government agencies to the airlines.
52 STAT. 1003 (1938), 49 U.S.C. § 490 (1940), CAA § 410 (1938). Greater authority
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Aeronautics Act which provides for assistance, financial and otherwise, to
carriers "operating" under "efficient" management.
Other ill effects of such a decision as the Western-United are inevitable.
The CAB openly has approved a sale at a price totally unrelated to the cost
of the assets involved 141 and thus has set a dangerous precedent sanctioning
future sales to the highest bidder,14 namely the major airlines with the neces-
sary capital. Intangible values have been introduced into the balance sheet
and will exercise a profound impact on rates, for the vendee desires a return
on the entire investment, comprising'both tangible and intangible assets.
Since the Board in the case asserted that steps were to be taken to prevent
the intangible value from affecting mail rates, passenger rates may well bear
the burden. In reality, the CAB has admitted its regulatory inadequacy by
permitting a value to be attributed to the certificate, which amount repre-
sents a capitalization of expected excess earnings, the fruit of Board ineffi-
ciency in restricting the rate of return to the tangible base."'
Board philosophy on mergers and sales has been partially successful. Use
of these techniques by the major airlines to further increase their size has
been somewhat thwarted. However, the use of the power to approve mergers
as an affirmative weapon of Board policy has not been explored, perhaps be-
cause of a belief on the part of the CAB that the most effective method of
reducing the oligopoly and of overcoming the difference in size of the carriers
is through the award of new route certificates. With the failure of the route
award technique to accomplish the desired results, the Board may have to
turn to a program of planned mergers. Pending investigations 151 provide a
springboard for any such approach, but the potential ill effects of makeshift
arrangements of expediency suggest great caution in its application.
Rates and Subsidies
The Board may exercise a direct influence on the operating revenues of
the airlines through its control of rates and subsidies. 5 2 Airlines are required
to file rate schedules with the CAB,1 53 which, in turn, may approve or sus-
over the financial affairs of the airlines has been requested by the Board. C.A.B. Am;.
REP.. 21 (1946).
148. The Board has sanctioned other transactions involving smaller sums where the
sale price was greater than the value of the tangible assets, holding that the price was "not
disproportionate to the values actually attached to the property and business." United
A.L., Acquisition of Lamsa, S.A., 4 C.A.B. 409, 413 (1943); Acquisition of Mdarquette by
TVA, 2 C.A.B. 409 (1940) (the Second Marquctte case).
149. In fact, Western Air Lines is planning to dispose of its Inland Air section, and
the bidding may be spirited. 47 AvIAWaIO N= No. 9, p. 12 (Sept. 1, 1947).
150. TROXE- EcoNoUIcs oF Puauc UirrEs 310 (1946).
151. See note 11 supra.
152. See generally Highsaw and Burt, Regulation of Rates in Air Transportation, 7
LA. L. RFv. 1, 1-22,378-97 (1946).
153. 52 STAT. 992 (1938), 49 U.S.C. §483 (1940), CAA §403 (1938).
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pend the proposed rates, or may promulgate a schedule of its own choice.U4
On the other hand, mail payments, often containing an element of subsidy,
are the initial responsibility of the Board and are based on the operating
statistics of the particular airline. A most important phase of government
assistance to the air transport industry and truly a subsidy is the establish-
ment and maintenance of the navigational and safety aids which comprise
the airways. Current indications are that in the near future the airlines may
be called upon to pay "use charges" in order to travel these airways. 1"
Scant attention has been paid by the Board to the matter of rate regula-
tion; the industry has possessed wide latitude in the promulgation of tariff
schedules. Possibly because of the oligopoly, advances and reductions in
fares generally have been effected by the simultaneous action of a number of
airlines. Other than in special instances of extremely limited consequence,"'
the Board only once has taken strong affirmative action against the airlines
in the matter of rates. During the war the profit position of the air carriers
was greatly improved by peak loads and high aircraft utilization, and the
Board considered a rate reduction to be appropriate. Although never prose-
cuted to a conclusion, this proceeding 117 was successful in its coercive role-
and also emphasized the extremity of circumstance required to prompt Board
action.
Board regulation of the economic structure of the industry and of the
component units has exercised a determinative effect on rates. Because of
a policy of restricted entry, the industry has been isolated from a competitive
force that might have exercised an important influence on costs and thereby
on rates similar to the development that occurred in the case of air cargo
transport.5 8 With the extreme importance of variable expenses in the indus-
try, control of costs is essential to lower rates, and Board policy, especially
the manner in which airmail subsidies are employed, has rendered the indus-
try blandly unconcerned with cost.' Little pressure has been brought to
154. 52 STAT. 1018, 49 U.S.C. §642(d) and (g)(1940), CAA §1002(d) and (g)
(1938). The CAB possesses limited power to fix interpational rates to the extent neces-
sary to correct discrimination. 52 STAT. 1018 (1938), 49 U.S.C. § 642(f) (1940), CAA
§ 1002 (f) (1938). The Board has frequently requested Congress to extend its powers
over international rates. C.A.B. ANN. REP. 14 (1942); id. at 21 (1946).
155. See C.A.A. REPORT OF A STUDY OF CHARGING FOR FEDFRAL AIRWAYS SzRVIMcs
(Dec. 31, 1946) (report to Congress).
156. E.g., Air Passenger Traffic Discount Investigation, 3 C.A.B. 242 (1942) (airline
credit card system); Government Travel Discount Tariff Investigation, 6 C.A.B. 825
(1946) (government employee discounts).
157. C.A.B. Doc. No. 850, Order 2164 (Feb. 27, 1943) (airlines ordered to reduce
rates 10%; proceeding later dropped after five carriers had complied).
158. See p. 1068 supra.
159. "I believe that we should critically examine the habit and method of subsidizing
air carriers. We should evaluate the situation to see if there is not a dulling of incen-
tive, resulting from the method of fixing payments. I fully recognize the current need
... but, we must not get into cost-plus habits in industry. When increased costs do
not affect profits, it seems reasonable to presume that most of the incentive toward effi-
1082 ,[Vol. 57: 1053
CIVIL AERONAUTICS BOARD POLICY
bear on the airlines to attain cost accounting accuracy in the proper alloca-
tion of "joint costs" to the respective service of mail, cargo and passenger
carriage.' Moreover, on the level of the rates proper, it is imperative that
the Board, in addition to evaluating the possible beneficial effects of compe-
tition from outside the industry, guard against the incipient development of
a rate bureau structure similar to that in existence in the railroad industry.16 1
Airmail payments, commonly referred to as subsidies, have been the sub-
ject of serious Board concern, unlike the matter of rates. Much discussion
has raged in the industry as to whether the subsidy was being extended to
the user of the airmail or to the airlines; but agreement exists that mail pay-
ments have not been related to the value of the services rendered. Disparate
mail rates have been evolved for carriers in differing financial positions.1 2
Service rates exist for the self-supporting airlines, and a number of formulae
are employed to compensate air carriers in "need" of support to finance
operating deficits.
In effect, the subsidy payment acts to preserve the status quo and the
inefficient. 16 ' Employing the subsidy as an affirmative instrument in the
expansion of the ill-advised "grandfather" route pattern, the CAB has en-
abled air carriers to add new routes relatively unhampered by economic con-
siderations. This has permitted the issuance of many certificates to appli-
cants motivated by various non-economic stimuli, prestige factors, and
defensive expansion to forestall possible future competition."6 4
Subsidy computations are based on past operating data, with no assurance
that previous expenses incurred have been the result of "efficient" manage-
ment. Occasionally an inadequate "yardstick" is furnished by the business
statistics of a competitor whose operating conditions are always distinguish-
able from those of the carrier under consideration. Since losses usually are
ciency and progress will be lost." Statement of AV. Averill Harriman, Secretary of Com-
merce, to the President's Air Policy Commission, Nov. 26, 1947, 94 Cong. Re. 44S
(Jan. 21, 1948). See also Nicholson, supra note 45, at 456 ct seq.
160. See Fpamcr, op. cit. supra note 15, at 412 et seq. This problem has long
faced the CAB though it has delayed taking definite action. See Burt and Highsar,
supra note 152, et seq. Yet the Board has stated its position on rates to be "The cheapest
rates consistent with sound economic principles!' North Atlantic Traffic Conference,
6 CA.B. 845, 850 (1946).
161. See Board Member Lee's dissent in the IATA Traffic Conference Resolution,
6 C.A.B. 639, 646 etseq. (1946).
162. See Highsaw and Burt, supra note 152; Frmmuoacx, op. cit. sutpra note 15, at
298 et seq.; Eastern A. L., Mail Rates, 6 C.A.B. 551 (1945) (450 per ton-mile decreed
for the four major airlines-calculated to guarantee a return of 24.57% on total invest-
ment required); National A.L. Mail Rates, 7 C.A.B. 387 (1946) (60 per ton-mile
granted; the CAB stated that service rates should be based on more than the operating
experience of one carrier. Id. at 405. The President's Air Policy Commission indorses
the continuance of direct Government financial aid. REPORT 102.
163. Further, the concept of mail rates based on a fair return to invested capital does
not take into account the need for equity capital, which is the type of security best suited
to air transport, an industry with fluctuating revenues. Harding, Air Transporlation
Rates, 18 HAnv. Bus. Rnv. 337, 340 (1940).
164. See Nicholson, supra note 45, at 454.
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assumed by the government, the carrier is free to continue operations un-
worried by the spectre of bankruptcy or reorganization.
An alternative, now practicable because of the Board investigation into
cargo rates to isolate rate-determining principles and joint costs, would be
to pay the airlines for the value of the service rendered in transporting the
mail.1"5 This would be the revenue that the air carrier could obtain by utiliz-
ing the space for the carriage of other type cargo. Any additional funds re-
quired by an airline to cofitinue operations would be a "real" and recogniz-
able subsidy separated from the mail payment for future Board considera-
tion. 6 Current CAB investigations into mail rates and uneconomic route
characteristics 16 may force revision of the present method of airmail pay-
ment and produce a new formula calculated to emphasize strict cost control
and lower rates.
CONCLUSION
The main task of the CAB is to make air transport cost conscious in order
that the potential market may be exploited and the consumer benefited."6
All phases of Board policy should be so oriented: the paternalistic subsidy
system should be drastically revised in order that assistance be given only to
those airlines exhibiting managerial efficiency in the control of costs; 1O new
entrants should be considered as a source of competitive pressure on the
presently certificated airlines; 170 and the wide disparity in size and strength
of the air carriers could be minimized in order that equal access may be had
to population pools and to the products of technological progress. 71
The CAB would seem to have struck upon a reasonable formula in its
avowed goal of "balanced competition". A closer approximation of word and
deed by the Board should contribute to the development of a national air
transport system and secure for the consuming public the same benefits in
all fields of air transportation that competition has produced in the field of
air cargo.
165. Id. at 456 et seq.
166. The President's Air Policy Commission can see no merit in such an approach at
this time, but recommends a study of the cost of airmail service with a view to the future.
The Commission's suggested formula for "need" airmail payments is complex, consisting
of "standard operating costs of various types of services [to] be developed by the Board"
and "kept current with changes in the general price level by frequent adjustments to con-
form to an industry cost index." REPoRT 103.
167. See note 11 supra.
168. The costs of air transport service are extremely high. Consult Crane, supra
note 30, at 500 et seq. A feeling exists that Board regulation has lessened the urge of
firms to reduce costs, since the CAB usually may be relied on to "legitimize" the higher
costs. See Healy, supra note 33, at 242.
169. For an example of CAB action in dealing with an inefficient carrier, see Colonial
Air., Mail Rates, 4 C.A.B. 71, 78 (1942) (In a mail rate case, Board refused to be swayed
by Colonial's low return because operating costs were far above those of industry.)
170. See WIPRUD, op. cit. supra note 7, at 44.
171. For a discussion of a new development that possibly may improve the competi-
tive position of the small airline, see Rheinstrom, The Avatlion Consultant, 14 J. Am
L. 24 (1947). A small carrier may now avail itself of many specialized services (tVarket
analysis, engineering research) which were formerly unavailable because of the pro-
hibitive cost.
1084 [Vol. 57: 1053
